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A. Marke Weisbura*
ABSTRACT

In response to recent violations of human rights, some
within the internationallegal community have called not only
for intervention but for the establishment of an international
court with jurisdictionto hear claims againstpersons alleged to
have committed those violations. This Article questions the
premise that it is necessary, or even desirable, for the
internationallegal community to mandate intervention in such
circumstances.
First, the Article examines the authority for international
intervention to forestall massive human rights violations.
Using the recent examples including Kosovo and East Timor,
the Author compares scholarly responses with respect to both
the human rights violations and the subsequent interventions.
While the Author concludes that there may be some reason to
believe that humanitarianinterventions are legal, there is no
clear authority that states have an affirmative obligation to
forestall massive human rights violations in other states.
Second, the Article questions whether it is possible to
implement a rule requiringinternationalintervention to prevent
such outbreaks of violence. Recognition of the difficulty of
responding to human rights violations around the world
complicates any formulation of a rule requiringaction against
evil.

* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The author thanks
the North Carolina Law Foundation for its support of this project.
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Third, the Author questions the propriety of such a rule
given other, sometimes conflicting, international rules. For
example, many norms of international law seek to minimize
interstate uses of force.
In addition, principles of selfdetermination act against the adoption of a rule requiring
intervention.
Finally, the Author casts doubt on the rationalesfor legal
rules specifying internationalreactions to outbreaks of violence
and the creation of institutions to respond to them. The Author
questions the utility and appropriatenessof such policies and
institutions while conceding the purposes for their creation may
be valid.
While multinational, humanitarian responses may be
appropriatein certain circumstances, they should not be legally
mandated.
The Author concludes that legalization of
internationalresponses to evil would be a mistake.
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I. INTRODUCTION

More and more frequently, one encounters the view that, as a
matter of international law, the international community should, or
even must, respond to instances of massive and extreme social evils.
For example, Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations,
at the opening of the General Assembly's session in September 1999,
called for "unity behind the principle that massive and systematic
violations of human rights-wherever they may take place-should
not be allowed to stand," and made reference to the "developing
international norm in favour of intervention to protect civilians from
wholesale slaughter."' The Secretary-General repeated this point in
November 1999 in his report to the General Assembly on the capture
of the UN "safe area" at Srebrenica in Bosnia-Hersegovina in July
1995:
The cardinal lesson of Srebrenica is that a deliberate and
systematic attempt to terrorize, expel[,j or murder an entire people
must be met decisively with all necessary means, and with the political
will to carry the policy through to its logical conclusion. In the Balkans,
in this decade, this lesson has had to be learned not once, but twice. In
both instances, in Bosnia and in Kosovo, the international community
tried to reach a negotiated settlement with an unscrupulous and
murderous regime. In both instances it required the use of force to
bring a halt to the planned and systematic killing and expulsion of
2
civilians.

The report prepared for the United Nations regarding the 1994
genocide in Rwanda reached a similar conclusion: "The United
Nations-and in particular the Security Council and troop.
contributing countries-must be prepared to act to prevent acts of
genocide or gross violations of human rights wherever they may take

1.
SECRETARY-GENERAL PRESENTS HIS ANNUAL
ASSEMBLY, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/7136 GAI9596 (Sept. 20. 1999).

REPORT

TO

GENERAL

2.
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution
53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica,54th Sess., Agenda Item 42, para. 502, at 108, U.N. Doc.
A/54/549 (1999).
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place. The political will to act should not be subject to double
'3
standards.
The report by the International Panel of Eminent Personalities
appointed by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to investigate
the Rwanda genocide (IPEP Report)4 carried this reasoning one step
further. After concluding that various states and the United Nations
had failed to take steps that could have averted the genocide or at
least reduced the number of deaths, 5 the report asserted:
Apologies alone are not adequate. In the name of both justice and
accountability, reparations are owed to Rwanda by actors in the
international community for their roles before, during, and since the
genocide. The case of Germany after World War Two is pertinent here.
We call on the UN secretary-general to establish a commission to
determine a formula for reparations and to identify which countries
should be obligated to pay, based on the principles set out in the report,
titled The Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for
Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, submitted January 18, 2000, to the UN Economic and Social
Council.

6

The response within the international legal community to
massive outbreaks of evil has not been limited to insistence upon a
duty of intervention; it also can be seen to include the establishment
of an international-or, more properly, supranational-court with
jurisdiction to try individuals alleged to have committed certain
human rights violations. In the summer of 1998, a large number of

3.
Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations
During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, at 7, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 15, 1999), at
http://www.un.org/Newsfossg/rwanda-report.htm [hereinafter UN Rwanda Report].
4.
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, INTERNATIONAL PANEL OF EMINENT
PERSONALITIES TO INVESTIGATE THE 1994 GENOCIDE IN RWANDA AND THE
SURROUNDING EVENTS (July 7, 2000), at http://www.oau-oua.org/Document/ipep/
ipep.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2001).
5.
Id. ch. 10.
6.
Id. ch. 24, para. 4.12. It should be noted that the Economic and Social
Council Document to which the International Panel of Eminent Personalities Report
refers was prepared for the Commission on Human Rights by its Special Rapporteur,
M. Cherif Bassiouni. Bassiouni's report describes itself as a draft of the principles that
Bassiouni believed governed the subject. The Right to Restitution, Compensation and
Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms: Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Submitted
in Accordance with Commission Resolution 1999/33, paras. 1-10, at 1-2, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/62 (Jan. 18, 2000). His draft principles would appear to address state
responsibility with respect to domestic human rights violations, though there is
perhaps some ambiguity on this point. Compare id., Annex, paras. 2-3, at 7, with id,,
Annex, para. 16, at 9. The Commission on Human Rights responded to this report by
requesting the Secretary-General to circulate it for comments to the member states of
the United Nations. The Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for
Victims of Grave Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N.
Commission on Human Rights Res. 2000/41, U.N. ESCOR, 56th Sess., 60th mtg. at
190-91, U.N. Doc. E/2000/23 E/CN.4/2000/167 (2000).
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states negotiated a treaty called the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute); under the Rome
Statute, this International Criminal Court (ICC) comes into existence
when the Statute goes into effect. 7

The Rome Statute further

provides that the ICC can assert jurisdiction in cases against
individuals alleged to have perpetrated a number of different types of
human rights violations 8 if such individuals are nationals of states
parties to it or are alleged to have committed offenses within the
Court's jurisdiction on the territory of a state party. 9 The jurisdiction
of the court is concurrent with that of individual countries; matters
that a state has either prosecuted or investigated and decided not to
prosecute are "inadmissable" before the ICC, unless the state in
question is "unwilling or unable genuinely" to investigate or to
prosecute. 10 The Statute, however, vests in the ICC the authority to
decide whether a given case meets the criteria for inadmissability. In
these circumstances, as Professor Alvarez has pointed out, it is
difficult to determine the extent to which the ICC, assuming it
eventually begins functioning, will in fact defer to investigations and
prosecutions by states. 1
Taken together, the statements quoted above and the
negotiation of the Rome Statute illustrate a number of propositions.
First, some states and some persons whose views are entitled to
weight clearly see the international community as possessing the
capacity to decide whether to impose duties on states to forestall
massive human rights violations and to punish individuals for
engaging in such violations. Second, there is a widespread view that
such duties have in fact been imposed, and take the form of quite
general rules, applicable without regard to the cultural peculiarities
important in particular situations. Third, the duties are owed to the
international community. This point is most obvious with respect to
states' duties to forestall human rights violations, since the duty is
asserted to be created by a rule promulgated by the international

7.

The treaty, known as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal

Court, goes into effect sixty days after "the deposit of the 60th instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations:'
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, art. 126, U.N. Doc. AICONF.18319 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome

Statute].
8.
The offenses include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
the crime of aggression. Id. art. 5. The Rome Statute defines each of these. Id. arts. 68. The ICC will also have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, once that crime is
addressed by an amendment to the Rome Statute. Id. art. 5(2).
9.
Id. art. 12(2).
10.
Id. art. 17(1)(a).
11.
Jos6 E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crinms of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda.
24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 476-78 (1999).
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community. It also applies, however, to the duty of individuals to
refrain from violating human rights because, as noted above, the ICC
is vested with the ultimate authority to decide whether a state's
treatment of any particular case is "genuine." Further, a corollary of
this latter proposition is that the authority of the ICC should
supersede that of states in those cases in which a state has not
exercised its authority in a way the ICC decides was genuine.
How can one assess the argument that international law
imposes, and should impose, duties regarding massive outbreaks of
evils? This Article attempts to do so by considering four aspects of
this proposition. The first is the question of authority-by what
process are these rules supposed to have acquired the status of law?
The answer to this question is obvious with respect to the ICC, but
much less clear with respect to the existence of a right or duty on the
part of states to forestall massive human rights violations. The
second question is the implementability of the rule: would it be
physically possible to actually put the rule into force? The third
question is that of the fit of such rules into the general corpus of
international law. Would rules of the type described above conflict
with other rules, promulgated for other purposes? The last question
is the desirability of the apparent objective of the rule-why is it
thought that institutionalizing such rules would be a good thing?
As will be shown by the discussion of these aspects of the
question of the legalization of international responses to massive evil,
this Article concludes that such legalization would be a mistake. The
point, emphatically, is not that such international responses are
never appropriate. It is, instead, that massive violations of human
rights differ so much from one another in the issues they present that
no limited menu of responses, such as a legal rule would require, can
be adequate to deal with either the questions of how outside states
ought to react to a given atrocity, or how, and by whom, the
While
perpetrators of atrocities should be called to account.
international approaches will be optimal, or at least acceptable, in
some cases, in others they may do actual harm. Indeed, as will be
argued below, the difficulties in internationalizing such matters are
so great that it would appear that the preference for international
approaches is more of a faith-based conviction than a conclusion
based on sober analyses of the legalities of the matter and of the
policy dilemmas such situations present.
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II. THE DUTY TO FORESTALL EVIL: THE BASIS OF AUTHORITY

A. Introduction
This section examines the authority of the duty to forestall
massive violations of human rights, the existence of which seems to
be taken for granted in the speech and report of Secretary-General
Annan, the report on the fall of Srebenica, and the OAU report on the
Rwanda genocide, all quoted above. 12 No similar issue presents itself
regarding the authority of the ICC because it will come into existence
only if the treaty creating it becomes effective. The mechanism for
examining this question will be an examination of the Spring 1999
NATO bombing campaign undertaken in response to continued
human rights violations in Kosovo, and of events subsequent to that
campaign.
B. The Intervention in Kosovo: The Facts
Some of the factual elements of the intervention in Kosovo are
uncontroversial. In the summer of 1998 the government of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) intensified its efforts to repress
a rebellion in Kosovo, a region legally part of Serbia but of which
ninety percent of the inhabitants were ethnic Albanians. 13 Yugoslav
efforts included widely reported massacres of civilians, and led
hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians to flee their homes,
seeking safety within Kosovo. 14 Other states demanded that the FRY
cease what was considered its oppression in Kosovo. The FRY did not
alter its policies,1 5 however, even after the Security Council, acting
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, expressed alarm at
"the impending humanitarian catastrophe" in Kosovo and demanded
that the FRY cease its operations against civilians.16 In the fall of
1998, NATO put its air forces on alert, the last step prior to
launching a bombing campaign intended to coerce the FRY to alter
its policies. At that point, the FRY agreed to a cease-fire to be

12.
See supranotes 1-4 and accompanying text.
13.
Steven Erlanger, U.S. and Allies Set Sanctions on Yugoslavia, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 1998, at A10; Philip Shenon, U.S. Eyes Curbs on Belgrade as Albanian Deaths
Mount, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1998, at A4.
14.
Jane Perlez, Massacresby Serbian Forces in 3 Kosov'o Villages, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1998, at Al.
15.
See generally id.
S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3930th ntg. pmbl., U.N. Doc.
16.
SIRES/l199 (1998).
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monitored by a group of unarmed civilians. 17 The Security Council
"endorsed" this agreement, and demanded that the FRY adhere
to
it. 1 8 The cease-fire quickly collapsed, however, and FRY security
forces perpetrated more massacres of civilians. 19 In March 1999
under great pressure from NATO, representatives of the FRY and of
the leading Albanian guerrilla group-the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA)-attended a conference in Rambouillet, France, aimed at
settling the crisis. 20
The FRY refused to accept an agreement,
however.
After last minute negotiations failed, NATO began a
bombing campaign directed against FRY forces in Kosovo and against
FRY infrastructure within Serbia proper. 21 NATO's objective was to
coerce the FRY into accepting a settlement. 22 NATO's leaders were
moved not only by events in Kosovo itself but also by memories of the
wide-spread atrocities perpetrated by Bosnian Serb forces during the
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the connivance of the government of
the FRY. 23 The bombing was expected to lead to FRY capitulation
after a few days of attacks. 24 The FRY held on stubbornly, however,
finally agreeing to terms acceptable to NATO only in June 1999, after
a bombing campaign lasting over two months, 25 and only after NATO
let it be known that it had begun serious planning for a ground
campaign against the FRY. 26 On June 10 the Security Council
adopted a resolution providing that the United Nations would take
responsibility for administering Kosovo during its period of
reconstruction, and thus helped to implement the agreement between
NATO and the FRY.2 7 In effect, the Security Council accepted the
result of the bombing campaign and deprived the FRY of effective

17.

Jane Perlez, Milosevic Accepts Kosovo Monitors, Averting Attack, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998, at Al.
18.
S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3937th mtg. para. 1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1203 (1998).

19.

Craig R. Whitney, NATO Threatens MilitaryAction to Stein the Violence in

Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1999, at Al.

20.

Carlotta Gall, Hopes for Kosovo Deal Rise as a Guerilla Chief Resigns, N.Y.

TIMES, Mar. 3, 1999, at Al.

21.

Francis X. Clines, NATO Opens Broad Barrage Against Serbs as Clinton

Denounces Yugoslav President, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at Al; Jane Perlez, NATO

Authorizes Bomb Strikes; Primakov, in Air, Skips U.S. Visit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1999,
at Al.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Blaine Harden, Surprising Lesson: Bombing Can Work, N.Y. TIMES, June
5, 1999, at A6.
25.
Craig R. Whitney, Bombing Ends as Serbs Begin Pullout, N.Y. TIMES, June
11, 1999, at Al.
26.
Michael R. Gordon & Eric Schmitt, Shift in Targets Let NATO Jets Tip the
Balance, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1999, at Al.
27.
S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244
(1999).
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sovereignty over Kosovo, at least temporarily. 28 A Russian resolution
condemning the bombing, offered shortly after the campaign
commenced, was rejected by the Security Council by a margin of 12
29
votes against to 3 in favor.
During the period from March to June 1999, FRY forces
intensified their actions against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, forcing
hundreds of thousands of civilians to take refuge in Albania and
Macedonia or to flee their homes while remaining in Kosovo. 30
Further, it is estimated that about 3,000 civilians were killed by FRY
forces during this period. 31 NATO's bombing, for its part, killed
32
approximately 500 civilians in Kosovo and in the FRY proper;
NATO pilots, ordered to limit their vulnerability to the FRY's antiaircraft defenses, carried out some missions at altitudes too high to
permit them to avoid mistaking what were in fact civilian targets for
33
military objectives.
C. The Interuention in Kosovo: Legal Analysis
If the basic facts of the Kosovo war are not subject to much
dispute, there is nonetheless considerable controversy among legal
scholars concerning the legality of NATO's bombing. One view,
expressed by Professor Charney, is that the bombing was patently
illegal.34 He stresses that it was not authorized by the Security
Council, and that, lacking such authorization, it was a violation of
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, a provision which he characterizes as
jus cogens.35 He acknowledges that the Charter itself gives weight to
the protection of human rights, but sees that objective as subordinate
to that of preventing uses of force that are neither authorized by the
Security Council nor undertaken in self-defense. 3 G Charney agrees
that states could have come to interpret the Charter as giving greater

28.
Id.
29.
Judith Miller, Russia's Move to End Strikes Loses; Margin Is a Surprise,
N.Y. TMES, Mar. 27, 1999, at A7.
30.
John Kifner, How Serb Forces Purged One Million Albanians, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 1999, at Al.
31.
Jonathan Steele, Serb Killings "Exaggerated"by West: Claims of Up to
100,000 Ethnic Albanians Massacred in Kosovo Revised to Under 3,00U as Exhumations
Near End,THE GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 18. 2000, at 3, 2000 WL 25687419.
32.
INT'L CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLVIA. FINAL REPORT TO
THE PROSECUTOR BY THE COMMI'TrEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW THE NATO BOMBING
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA para. 90 (20UO).

33.
Eric Schmitt & Steven Lee Myers, NATO Planes Flying LoWer. Increasing
Risk of Being Hit, N.Y. TIMES, May 4. 1999. at A19.
34.
Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory HumanitarianIntervention in Koststo. 93
Ad. J. INT'L L. 834, 841 (1999).
35.
Id. at 835.
36.
Id. at 835-36.
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weight to the protection of human rights than would be apparent
from its text. 37 He denies, however, that such a development has in
fact occurred. 3 8 He addresses the question of the form any new law
on this subject could take and suggests a list of quite restrictive
criteria.3 9 Applying these criteria to the Kosovo bombing, he
concludes that it would have been unlawful even under this standard,
among other reasons, because the human rights violations in the
months immediately preceding the bombing campaign were not
40
sufficiently grave to justify humanitarian intervention.
Professor Brownlie's views are similar, though he does not
characterize Article 2(4) as jus cogens. He stresses his conclusion
that most scholars of international law deny the lawfulness of
humanitarian intervention and asserts that a campaign of aerial
bombing concentrating on the targets which NATO attacked could
not be considered humanitarian. 4 1 In addition to his conclusion that
the bombing campaign was unlawful, he asserts that the NATO
threats of bombing, beginning with those made in October 1998, were
unlawful.42
Judge Cassese also asserts quite unequivocally that the bombing
was unlawful as contrary to the Charter. 43 He freely acknowledges,
however, the possibility of the future emergence of a new rule of
customary law permitting humanitarian intervention in limited
circumstances. 44 He suggests a list of requirements for legality
somewhat less extensive than that proposed by Professor Charney. 45
Professor Reisman takes a completely opposite view. He insists
that as a consequence of the growth in legal importance of the
protection of human rights, the interpretation of Article 2(4) was
necessarily affected by the shrinking scope of Article 2(7), forbidding

Id. at 836.
37.
38.
Id.
39.
Id. at 836-37.
40.
Id. at 839.
41.
Ian Brownlie, Memorandum, in SELECT COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
HOUSE OF COMMONS (U.K.), FOURTH REPORT: KOSOVO app. 2, paras. 36-80, 96-98
(2000) [hereinafter HOUSE OF COMMONS KOSOVO REPORT]. It should be noted that
Professor Brownlie represented the FRY in the proceedings the FRY brought against in
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against a number of NATO members, seeking
relief with respect to what the FRY characterized as NATO's illegal bombing. Id. para.
3.
42.
Id.
Are We Moving Towards
Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ius oritur:
43.
International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World
Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 23, 29 (1999).
Id.
44.
45.
Id. at 27. In a subsequent comment, Judge Cassese concluded that such a
rule cannot be said to have come into existence yet. Antonio Cassese, A Follow.Up:
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures and Opinio Necessitatis, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L.
791, 791-99 (1999).
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UN action with respect to matters within the domestic jurisdiction of
its members. 46 Indeed, he describes the international law of human
rights as requiring the use of force where needed to prevent serious
human rights violations. 47 Reisman describes the international legal
process which has given rise to this law as including
"intergovernmental organizations, private entities, the mass media,
nongovernmental organizations[,] and individuals ....".8 He does

not specifically address the question of the degree of seriousness of
human rights violations required to trigger a right to humanitarian
intervention, stating only that the right does not depend on the
occurrence of an event "on the scale of the Holocaust." 49

Professor

Reisman also notes that the international protection of human rights
has been characterized as jus cogens, which he describes as having
come to mean, "[i]n human rights discourse . . . a type of super-

custom, based on trans-empirical sources and hence not requiring
demonstration of practice as proof of its validity."5 0
Professor Greenwood has taken a position consistent with that of
Professor Reisman, laying particular stress on relatively recent state
practice. 51 In particular, he has pointed to two actions not authorized
by the Security Council: the intervention by troops of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the Liberian civil
war, which the Council formally supported only some time after it
took place, and the establishment of safe havens for refugees in
northern Iraq and a "no-fly" zone in southern Iraq. 5 2 According to
Professor Greenwood, these instances of practice led to the conclusion
that customary international law permits humanitarian intervention,
stressing the increasing importance of human rights principles in
international law and adding:
Furthermore, an interpretation of international law which would forbid
intervention to prevent something as terrible as the Holocaust. unless a
permanent member could be persuaded to lift its veto, would be

46.
(1999).
47.
48.

W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo's Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INr'L L. 860, 861
Id. at 860.62.
Id. at 862.

49.
Id.at 861.
50.
W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the
World Constitutive Process: The Special Problenz of Humanitarian Intervention, 11
EUR. J. INT'L L. 3, 15 n.29 (2000).
51.
See generally Minutes of Evidence, Memorandum Submitted by Christopher
Greenwood, Q.C., in HOUSE OF COMMONS Kosovo REPORT, supra note 41 [hereinafter
Greenwood Memorandum]. It should be noted that Professor Greenwood represented
the government of the United Kingdom in the proceedings before the ICJ in which
Professor Brownlie represented the FRY. Id. para. 2.
52.
Id. paras. 15, 16.

236

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:225

contrary to the principles on which modern international law is based
53
as well as flying in the face of the developments of the last 50 years.

He further asserts that the circumstances in Kosovo justified such an
intervention, pointing to the Security Council's reference to an
"impending humanitarian catastrophe" in the fall of 1998 and to the
large numbers of persons displaced as a result of the actions of the
government of the FRY.54 Professor Greenwood does not refer, in
55
this context, to the concept ofjus cogens.
Most commentators take positions more equivocal than those
quoted above. Professor Henkin asserts that the use of force without
Security Council approval should be considered unlawful, unless
retrospectively approved, as he concludes was the case with regard to
Kosovo. 5 6 Professor Wedgwood, while not taking a definite position,
stresses the practice-based character of international law and places
weight both on the refusal of the Security Council to condemn
NATO's action and on the implicit, post hoc approval accorded by the
Security Council to the ECOWAS interventions in Liberia and Sierra
Leone. 57 Professor Chinkin, though apparently willing to entertain
the argument that humanitarian intervention could be lawful, or at
least morally required, criticizes both the disregard of the Security
Council by an alliance led by the United States and the
disproportionate character of the military action. 58 She also criticizes
the failure of the states that intervened in Kosovo to take similar
actions in other cases in which widespread human rights violations
occurred. 59 Professor Falk also criticizes the manner in which NATO
conducted its campaign and questions as well whether NATO had
done all that was possible diplomatically to resolve the situation prior
to initiating the bombing. 60 He rejects, however, the argument that
intervention could not have been legal, treating protection of human
rights as a crucial element of international law, and seeing a "global
ethos of responsibility" as having superseded any merely literal
reading of the Charter which would preclude responses to a
"humanitarian imperative."' 61

53.
54.

Id. para. 17.
Id. paras. 11-18, 20-26.

55.
56.

See generally id.
Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of "HumanitarianIntervention," 93 AM.

J. INT'L L. 824, 827 (1999).
57.
Ruth Wedgwood, NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 828,
830-31, 832 (1999).
58.
Christine M. Chinkin, Kosovo: A "Good" or "Bad" War ?, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
841, 843-44, 844-45 (1999).
59.
Id. at 847.

60.

Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order,and the Future of InternationalLaw,

93 AM. J. INT'L L. 847, 852-53, 854-56 (1999).
61.
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Professor Franck sees the campaign as not substantially
weakening the force of Article 2(4)'s prohibition uses of force not
authorized by the Security Council, despite the Council's apparent
condoning of NATO's actions in light of its objectives. He also
observes that "[o]ne [lesson of the action in Kosovo] is that [the]
egregious repression of minorities is not a risk-free venture,
particularly for smallish states. That cannot be a statement of law,
but, like law, it is a fairly accurate predictor of state behavior." 62
Professor Simma, addressing NATO's threats of uses of force made
prior to the bombing and not the bombing itself, concluded that such
threats were clear violations of Article 2(4), which he characterizes as
jus cogens, rejecting the argument that the legal effect of the Charter
could be altered by any means other than a change in the Charter
itself.6 3 He also concludes, however, that "only a thin red line
separates NATO's action on Kosovo from international legality,""'
relying for this conclusion on the extent of the humanitarian
emergency in Kosovo, on the fact that NATO acted to prevent
developments which the Security Council itself had condemned in the
strongest terms, and on the characterization by NATO members of
their actions as properly seen as a compelled response to an
extraordinary situation and not intended to have precedential
effect. 65 In this connection, it is interesting to note that Professor
Simma attaches no weight, in evaluating the threats of force by
which NATO obtained the FRY's agreement to the cease-fire of
October 1998, to the post hoc endorsement of the cease-fire by the
Security Council in its resolution 1203.66 He bases this conclusion
primarily on the fact that Russia had made clear, prior to the
adoption of resolution 1203, that it was unalterably opposed to the
use of force in this situation, making unreasonable an interpretation
of that resolution as reflecting an approval of the actions taken to
bring the cease-fire into being.6 7 Further, he notes that "the Security
Council, as a political organ entrusted with the maintenance or
restoration of peace and security rather than as an enforcer of
international law, will in many instances have to accept or build upon
facts or situations based on, or involving, illegalities." 68

62.
63.
J. INT'L L.
64.
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Thomas M. Franck, Lessons of Kosov'o, 93 AM. J. INT"L L. 857, 859 (1999).
Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EuR.
1, 1-6 (1999).
Id. at 22.
Id. at 12-13.
Id. at 11.
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Id.
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D. The Intervention in Kosovo: Analysis of the Analysis
Perhaps the most striking thing about the foregoing section is
the great diversity of opinion among the scholars quoted. They
disagree, not simply as to the legality of the intervention in Kosovo,
but also as to sources from which international legal rules may be
derived. One can identify a number of competing approaches. Some
of the scholars quoted give decisive weight to the text of the Charter,
perhaps fortifying that conclusion by the argument that Article 2(4)
is jus cogens. Others rely on the text, supplemented by practice
within the organization-though different scholars draw quite
different conclusions from the same examples of practice. Other
scholars give as much or more weight to the actual practice of states,
though only Professor Wedgwood of those quoted seems to have
considered the NATO campaign itself as an instance of practice that
bore on the campaign's legality. 69 Finally, Professors Falk and
Reisman appear to place great weight on the support of entities other
than states for the proposition that protection of human rights is an
international legal principle superseding all others in importance.
The positions taken by these scholars can, of course, be
evaluated as well as described. With respect to his treatment of the
facts, Professor Charney's focus on the human rights situation just
prior to NATO's bombing ignores the suspicions that could
reasonably have been entertained regarding the FRY's intentions in
light of that government's close ties to the Bosnian Serb forces during
the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina 70 and of the atrocities
perpetrated by those forces. On the law, Professor Charney seeks to
argue that any departure from the text of the Charter must
necessarily be seen as a violation of the provisions of that
instrument.7 1 Professor Simma seems to share this view. 72 This
position seems difficult to maintain.
Practice under both the
substantive and the procedural provisions of the Charter has
significantly deviated over the years from that which would appear to
be required by the Charter's text. Regarding substantive provisions,
the significant weakening of Article 2(7)'s prohibition on
interferences by the UN in matters essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of a member state, as by the intervention in Somalia
authorized by the Security Council, is hard to square with the text of
that article. Similarly, the effective rejection by the ICJ of the

69.
Wedgwood, supra note 57, at 832, 833.
70.
See A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as
Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 5-6 (1995).
71.
See generally Charney, supra note 34.
72.
See generally Simma, supra note 63.
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application to the organs of the UN of the principle of ultra vires-in
the context of a challenge to the legality of certain UN operations
because those operations were authorized by a UN organ other than
the one competent to authorize them 73-makes it difficult to argue
that the Charter's procedural provisions must be applied literally.
Leaving aside questions regarding his interpretation of the Charter,
the long list of conditions that Professor Charney would require
lawful humanitarian interventions to meet seems to be difficult to
reconcile with the emergency situation in which any humanitarian
intervention would take place, and to give strikingly wide scope for
subsequent judicial second guessing of the decisions made by political
and military leaders operating under considerable pressure.
Professor Brownlie's position acknowledges that state practice
contrary to that required by the Charter can change international
law, 74 but gives no weight to the actions of the nineteen states who
elected to bomb within the FRY over the Kosovo matter or to those of
the members of the Security Council who refused to condemn their
behavior. Professors Wedgwood and Greenwood both place some
weight on actions taken by ECOWAS in Liberia, even though that
intervention-at least ostensibly aimed at dealing with chaos in a
failed state-was different from NATO's intervention that was
intended to weaken the authority of a fully functioning state over a
portion of its territory. The positions of Professors Chinkin and Falk
and of Judge Cassese resemble that of Professor Charney in seeking
simultaneously to permit humanitarian intervention while hedging
the practice with a list of conditions that are unlikely to be clearly
met in any situation. Finally, Professors Falk and Reisman seek to
defend the legality of at least some humanitarian interventions on
the basis of positions taken by groups and individuals whose capacity
to make law seems doubtful.
Particularly in this last connection, it is necessary to consider
reliance on the concept of jus cogens. Such legal status as this
concept possesses derives from its inclusion in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties 75 (Vienna Convention), an instrument to
which fewer than half the members of the United Nations are
parties, 76 and which therefore cannot be seen as embodying rules of
customary international law solely because of the number of states
who have adhered to it.
To further complicate matters, the

73.
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20).
74.
See generally Brownlie, supra note 41.
75.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969. 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 39127 [hereinafter Vienna Convention).
76.
There are currently 185 members of the United Nations. MULTILATERAL
TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL:

STATUS AS AT 30 APRIL 1999, at

3 (1999). The Vienna Convention has only eighty-nine parties and does not include
such states as France, India, and the United States. Id. at 811-12.
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discussions cited above use the term in a way that appears to differ
from its usage in the Vienna Convention. That treaty defines the
term as follows:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is
a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
77
international law having the same character.
As Professor Reisman himself observes, the idea of jus cogens as
deriving from trans-empirical sources is quite different from the
concept as used in the Vienna Convention. 78
Even the usage
employed by Professors Charney and Simma seems problematic. As
the Vienna Convention requires that a jus cogens concept be
recognized as such by the "international community of states as a
whole," 79 application of that concept necessarily turns on the practice
of states. If state practice is the test of the jus cogens character of a
rule, it seems difficult to reconcile an assertion that a particular rule
is of jus cogens status with the simultaneous acknowledgment that
nineteen important states have violated the rule and that twelve of
the fifteen members of the Security Council have refused to condemn
the violation.
As the Author has suggested elsewhere, 80 arguments based on
notions of jus cogens grounded on sources other than the positive acts
of states suffer from a number of fundamental difficulties.
For
present purposes, it is enough to mention two. First, how is it that
the entities listed by Professor Reisman as part of the international
legal process, and which presumably are part of the source of the
international ethos to which Professor Falk refers,81 acquire the
authority to make law? Even if one argues that law is somehow an
emanation from Holmes' "brooding omnipresence in the sky,"8 2 it can
have effect in human communities only if it is recognized. This point
forces one to ask, whose recognition counts? Particularly if it is
argued that a given rule at least justifies, if it does not require,
military operations-which is to say, killing-the person enunciating
the rule must have some claim to authority beyond a pure heart. The

77.
Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 53 (Treaties Conflicting with a
Peremptory Norm of General International Law ("Jus Cogens")).
78.
Reisman, supra note 50, at 15 n.29.
79.
Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 53.
80.
Weisburd, supra note 70, at 24-40.
81.
See generally Falk, supra note 60.
82.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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groups to which Professor Reisman refers, however, would seem to
have no other basis for their claim to a capacity to make law.
The second problem with the invocation of jus cogens is the
degree of disagreement as to its content. In this case, for example,
Professors Charney and Simma label Article 2(4) jius cogens,
rendering NATO's actions in Kosovo clearly illegal. 83 Professor
Reisman argues that a rule forbidding massive violations of human
rights is jus cogens,8 4 at least permitting and perhaps requiring at
least some use of force in Kosovo. The other scholars quoted ignore
the concept. In these circumstances, it seems impossible to be
confident as to the content of jus cogens. Yet the idea of deriving
legal rules from "trans-empirical sources" presumably depends on the
existence of a set of rules whose correctness is so obvious to all
concerned that no further justification is required. If, however, there
is no agreement as to which rules merit this description, it can hardly
be true that there are rules as obviously correct as the transempirical jus cogens concept presupposes.
Drawing this discussion together, it can be seen that there is
little agreement among scholars as to the permissibility of NATO's
actions in Kosovo. In considering the authority for the proposition
that international law requires states to forestall massive human
rights violations, however, it is also necessary to consider events that
have taken place since the Kosovo bombing.
E. HumanitarianIntervention Since Kosovo
In July 1999 after the inhabitants of East Timor had voted
overwhelmingly against remaining a part of Indonesia, militia groups
favoring continued Indonesian control of the area began a campaign
of great violence. Many were killed, hundreds of thousands were
displaced, and the infrastructure of the area was greatly damaged.
The Indonesian military not only failed to prevent the violence, but
apparently provided the militia groups with various kinds of support.
Many states strongly criticized Indonesia; however, no steps were
taken to implement a forcible intervention without the consent of
Indonesia. Instead, intense effort was expended to persuade the
Indonesian government to agree to UN administration of East Timor
pending independence. Indonesia finally agreed to this arrangement
in August 1999, and the Security Council in turn authorized a UN
85
operation.

83.
Charney, supranote 34, at 837; Simma, supra note 63. at 3.
84.
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85.
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The second incident relevant to this discussion began in the
summer of 1999. Armed groups of Chechen guerillas, operating from
Chechnya, attacked Dagestan, a part of Russia adjacent to
Chechnya. 86 Russia repulsed the attack, and subsequently began
military operations against Chechnya. 8 7 Originally portrayed as an
effort to limit Chechen attacks on Russia, the operation clearly
became one to reconquer Chechnya, which had attained de facto
independence from Russia after bitter fighting during the period
1994-1996. 88 The Russian operations in Chechnya led to heavy
civilian casualties due to the tactics employed. 89 Aside from muted
criticism of Russia, however, states did not respond to these
90
operations.
Another relevant incident began attracting attention in early
2000.
United Nations peacekeepers, operating in Sierra Leone
pursuant to a July 1999 agreement ending the civil war in that
country, were denied access to the portion of the country controlled
by the Revolutionary United Front (RUE), a group whose opposition
to the elected government had led to the civil war and that had been
allotted a share of power by the 1999 agreement. 91 The situation
quickly degenerated into renewed warfare in Sierra Leone, as the
RUF apparently sought to renew the war. 92 The ensuing violence led
to international calls to tear up the peace agreement and institute
trials for violations of humanitarian law. 93 These reactions were
prompted to a great extent by the RUF's brutal tactics during the
war, which had focused on terrorizing civilians by the use of
widespread maiming. 94
Although the leader of the RUF was
subsequently arrested for his role in the Spring 2000 violence, only
the United Kingdom provided any assistance to the peacekeepers and
95
to the army of Sierra Leone.
These incidents share a number of characteristics and will
require further discussion below. For present purposes, it is enough
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to note that each involved significant human rights violations, and
that no outside states intervened militarily in response to those
violations without the permission of the territorial sovereign.
Therefore, the international reaction to these situations is clearly
inconsistent with some blanket rule requiring states to forestall
massive human rights violations elsewhere and suggests what are at
least prudential limitations on the right to intervene in such
circumstances.
F. Authority for HumanitarianIntervention: Conclusion
What then can be gleaned from all of this? Determining the
state of international legal authority for humanitarian intervention is
difficult at best, and more likely impossible. As noted above, scholars
differ on the most fundamental questions regarding the nature of
authority in international law. There appear to be, roughly, three
approaches. One focuses on treaties, particularly the United Nations
Charter, and applies them as written. According to this approach,
practice contrary to a treaty is irrelevant. A second approach
likewise ignores practice, but relies on more diffuse sources as the
basis for rules that states are presumed to be powerless to alter. The
third approach would place primary emphasis on state practice in
determining the content of rules of international law.
The first two approaches lead to quite different conclusions on
these facts. The Charter-centered focus leads to the conclusion that
the Kosovo bombing, and presumably any humanitarian
intervention, is unlawful unless authorized by the Security Council.
The trans-empirical approach, with its stress on the absolute primacy
of human rights, could treat the Kosovo bombing as lawful. Though
these two ways of thinking about authority in international law lead
to different results in this case, they share a conviction that there are
rules of international law that states simply cannot change, except
perhaps by amending the Charter. Both of these approaches share
the defect that this immutable character they assign to certain rules
of international law is inconsistent with the nature of the
international legal system. Except for cases in which Chapter VII of
the Charter applies, states have not subordinated themselves to
institutions that can compel their adherence to rules the states
themselves reject. In such a situation, to assert that a given legal
rule is unchangeable necessarily begs the question of how states
could place beyond their power the ability to change the rule. Rather,
unsatisfactory as it may be from a number of perspectives, the
international legal system can hardly be thought to include rules that
states, in fact, simply do not follow.
If one accepts this approach to authority, one has effectively
adopted the third approach. From this perspective, an assessment of
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the Kosovo campaign is easy. An action taken collectively by
nineteen states, the reaction to which from all but a few other states
is a more or less approving silence, can be labeled illegal only if the
source of the alleged illegality is some sort of fixed rule, not
dependent on acceptance by states for its effectiveness. If one denies
the existence of such rules, then one has no basis for labeling the
Kosovo bombing campaign illegal.
By extension, other similar
actions would likewise not be illegal. The only caveat that must be
invoked here is that Kosovo represented an extreme situation. Not
only were the actions of the FRY reprehensible, but they appeared to
be motivated by nothing more than hatred of the Kosovo Albanians.
At the same time, reacting forcibly to those actions posed relatively
little risk of a serious international conflict, given the vast
disproportion between the resources of NATO and those of the FRY.
If an intervention was launched against actions not so easily ascribed
to simple hatred, or in circumstances where the risks created by the
intervention were greater than was true in Kosovo, states could well
react differently than they did to NATO's bombing campaign.
Further, it is impossible to ignore in this connection the varying
international reactions to the incidents in East Timor, Chechnya, and
Sierra Leone. The refusal of the international community to act in
Chechnya, the insistence on Indonesian assent with regard to East
Timor, and the tepid reactions to events in Sierra Leone are simply
inconsistent with any acceptance by states of a duty to act triggered
whenever significant violations of human rights take place.
The tentative conclusion on this point, then, can be that at least
some humanitarian interventions appear to be lawful, even without
Security Council authorization. There is, however, not only no clear
authority for the proposition that states have an affirmative
obligation to do what may be needed to forestall massive human
rights violations in other states, but also considerable practice
inconsistent with the existence of such a duty.

III. IMPLEMENTABILITY

A. Preliminaries
The foregoing Section demonstrates that there is little to support
the argument that international law requires states to forestall
massive outbreaks of evil in other states. It also shows that the
legality of humanitarian intervention has been tested and arguably
accepted only for a limited number of situations. To say that a rule
does not exist, however, is hardly to say that such a rule could not be
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brought into existence. This Section therefore examines this aspect
of the question of mandating international legal reactions to evil.
One basic question asks: can the rules that are the subject of
this discussion accomplish their objectives? This in turn breaks down
into two questions. First, assume that a given rule is implemented.
Will applying the rule accomplish the purpose for which the rule was
crafted? Second, assume that application of the given rule will
indeed achieve the purpose for which the rule was crafted. Is it
physically possible to apply the rule?
The answer to the first of the two questions depends on whether
one is focusing on the putative rule requiring intervention to forestall
massive human rights violations or on the rule requiring
international criminal punishment of persons proven to have
perpetrated serious violations of human rights. The first of these two
rules requires achieving a particular objective; hence, if the rule is
applied, its application must by definition accomplish the objective of
the rule.
The objectives to be furthered by establishing the ICC are less
directly linked to the operation of the Rome Statute. Those objectives
are numerous. The Rome Statute itself refers to ending impunity for
those responsible for massive human rights violations and to
deterring such violations. 96 Others add as objectives for such a body
the establishment of a historical record, promotion of reconciliation in
a state in which human rights violations have taken place by fixing
responsibility for those violations on individuals, and providing a
sense of closure. 97 The first objective-ending impunity-is seen in
part as an end in itself and will be discussed below. 98 The other
objectives have been the object of thoughtful analysis by others, who
have shown that it is by no means obvious that the ICC could achieve
any of them.99
Since there already exist excellent discussions of the reasons for
doubt that the ICC could accomplish its objectives if it functioned as
planned, the following will address the second implementability
issue: could these rules in fact be put into practice? What would
actual implementation of these rules require?
Is such
implementation possible?
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B. Acting Against Evil: From the Abstract to the Concrete
Any discussion of preventing massive human rights violations or
of putting human rights violators on trial is incomplete if it focuses
solely on the end to be achieved. A complete discussion also requires
paying some attention to the means whereby the end is to be
achieved. Those means will be very costly because in many cases the
means will necessarily be war.
Perhaps that observation merely belabors the obvious.
Certainly, experience has demonstrated that at least a credible
threat of force will be necessary in many cases, and the actual use of
force will be required in some cases, to halt human rights violations.
Likewise, perhaps it is clear that a willingness to use force may well
be required if persons alleged to have violated human rights are to be
put on trial. Persons criticizing the failure of NATO forces to arrest
individuals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia have not asserted that such arrests could be
effected easily, but rather have argued that NATO should be
prepared to suffer casualties in order to bring war criminals to
trial.100
It may be less clear, however, that still other sorts of situations
could present themselves. Suppose, for example, that one side in a
civil war perpetrates human rights violations clearly sufficient to
trigger the jurisdiction of the ICC, although not of the magnitude of
those that took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina, or Rwanda, or were
feared in Kosovo. Suppose the war ends rather quickly, with the side
perpetrating the violations in such a weak position that its leaders
agree to cease fighting simply in return for an amnesty. The ICC
would be able to try such persons only if they could be seized. 01'
Thus, the ICC could in such a case operate effectively only if the local
government was willing to risk reigniting the civil war by arresting
the persons accused, or if a foreign state were willing to invade to
accomplish the same purpose.
Further, even if it is obvious that war will likely be required in
many cases to end massive human rights violations and to seize the
perpetrators of those violations, that fact is in itself reason to hesitate
to recognize a flat obligation for states to take such actions. Are we
really prepared to say that the states of the world are legally obliged
to go to war against Russia in order to end human rights violations in
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Chechnya and to seize for trial all persons who caused such violations
to occur?
Turning from the fact that war would be necessary to implement
an international response to evil, there is a second element of this
matter which requires consideration but that has received little
attention. That is, what happens after the intervention has taken
place? If massive human rights violations take place in a particular
state, one of two circumstances will very likely exist. Either the
government of that state is incapable of maintaining order, meaning
that the government is unable to protect the population fiom nongovernment groups intent on perpetrating human rights violations,
or else the government itself is violating the rights of some portion of
the population. Whichever is true, it follows that a key precondition
for the events that required humanitarian intervention was a
problem with the government, either of weakness or of malevolence.
Under such circumstances, whatever entities carry out the
intervention are faced with two unattractive alternatives. If they
simply halt the human rights violations, perhaps disarm the
perpetrators, and then leave, the circumstances that produced the
problem may well recur, forcing another intervention.
If the
intervenors seek to address the circumstances that produced the
problem, however, they must necessarily seize control of the state
and remain in control until there exists an indigenous government
strong enough to maintain order but not disposed to perpetrate
human rights violations. Such a government will hardly appear by
magic, however. Indeed, if, as argued above, the flaws of the
government produced by local political processes were necessarily
important elements of the environment that led to massive human
rights violations, it is at least possible that the normal workings of
local politics would, if allowed to function unchecked, simply produce
another weak or vicious government. If the intervenors feel they
cannot leave until a reliable government is in place, and if the local
political system must be changed significantly before they are likely
to produce a reliable government, it follows that the intervention
cannot end until the state in which the intervention took place has, in
important respects, been fundamentally restructured.
In other
words, the intervenors' alternatives are ending the immediate crisis
and leaving the locals to pick up the pieces, or imposing what
amounts to a benevolent colonial regime aimed at enabling the locals
to select their own government without opening the door for further
horrors.
The problem this situation presents arises from the difficulties of
restructuring the target of the intervention. As the world has
learned, it is not easy for even well-intentioned foreigners to enter
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another state and alter its fundamentals. The effort to reconstruct
Somalia was, of course, a failure.' 0 2 Although Haiti no longer
experiences the repression that predated the restoration of President
Aristide, it remains a state in deep difficulty, 0 3 despite an extensive
"nation-building" operation following the restoration. 0 4 The results
of the United Nations' effort to reconstruct Cambodia were decidedly
mixed, 0 5 and its current effort in Kosovo is likewise encountering
06

serious difficulties.1

Further, such reconstruction efforts can be costly. Foreign
military units sent to maintain the peace may incur casualties, as
took place in East Timor in the summer of 2000.107 Nor are the
For example, President Clinton's
monetary costs insignificant.
proposed Fiscal Year 2001 budget sought $1,387.8 million for
American military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and $1,650.4
million for such operations in Kosovo.' 0 8 The General Assembly has
voted to provide $200 million for the operation of the United Nations
Mission in Kosovo for the period 2000-2001.109 Of course the other
states providing troops for the NATO operations in both these areas
are also incurring financial costs.
Humanitarian intervention thus cannot be assumed to involve
merely a war to halt human rights violations. Such interventions
will also in many cases necessarily involve the assumption by some
states or international organization of the duty of creating a political
system that will both refrain from human rights violations itself and
prevent others from perpetrating such violations. This is true despite
the spotty record of such efforts at nation-building and in spite of the
costs-in money and potentially in lives-that such efforts must
generate.
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C. HumanitarianIntervention: Physical Limitations
The foregoing discussion addresses some of the implications of
accepting a duty to intervene to prevent human rights violations or to
seize individuals alleged to have perpetrated such violations. That
discussion, however, begs an important question. Suppose timely
action is physically impossible?
Modern systems of communication and transportation permit
governments both to learn about events in distant places and to
dispatch troops to such places much more quickly than could be done
even twenty years ago. But it is one thing to say that obtaining
information and arranging movement is much easier than in the
past; it is quite another to assert that it is possible to obtain
information from anywhere on the planet instantly, or to move
military units to any country as quickly as would be possible if there
were available matter transporters similar to those of the U.S.S.
Enterprise(the starship, not the aircraft carrier).
Of course, no one has actually asserted that it is possible
instantaneously either to obtain information or to move troops."10
Nevertheless, few of the discussions of obligations to forestall massive
human rights violations discuss the practical question of how outside
states are to learn of the evils being perpetrated, what sort of
military units could be sent in response, or how quickly those units
could arrive.
Obviously such questions are central. One cannot respond to an
event of which one is unaware. Further, even if one is aware of an
emergency in another state, it may be physically impossible to react.
Imagine a land-locked, remote country, reachable only by air. If an
intervention were to be attempted in such a country, airlift capacity
would thus be crucial. Suppose the country had only one airport
with a runway long enough and parking areas large enough to service
a Boeing 747 jet airliner, though the runway was only just long
enough and the parking areas could handle no more than six 747's at
once. Could the United States, for instance, intervene quickly in such
a country?
Answering this question must start with a consideration of the
means available for such an intervention.
The long-distance
transport aircraft used by the U.S. Air Force are the C-141, C-5, and
C-17. As of December 2000 there were available a total of 170 C141's, of which 96 were assigned to reserve and national guard units;
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126 C-5's, some of which were assigned to reserve units; and 64 C17's, of which 6 were assigned to national guard units. The C-141 is
the least useful of the three, as its cargo capacity is only 60% of that
of the C-17 and only 34.25% of that of the C-5. Further, unlike the
other two aircraft, the C-141 cannot carry outsize cargo, such as
tanks."' Both in terms of its capacity and in terms of the numbers
available, the C-5 is currently the most significant aircraft in the Air
Force's transport fleet. But the C-5 requires both a longer runway
and a larger parking area than does the Boeing 747.112
In other
words, our hypothetical country may not be accessible to a C-5, even
though it is accessible to a 747. If the United States found itself
forced to deploy troops by air to this country, one-third of the air
force's transport aircraft, amounting to approximately sixty-one
percent of its cargo capacity, could not be used." 3 In such a case, a
quick deployment would necessarily be difficult.
A few concrete examples can highlight this point. The genocide
in Rwanda has been held up as an example of international
indifference to massive human rights violations." 4 Yet it is by no
means clear that intervention in time to halt that genocide was
physically possible. The genocide began on April 7, 1994, and spread
throughout the country by April 13.115 Very large numbers of
16
persons had been murdered no later than the end of the month.'
Yet, according to a careful analysis of this event by Alan J.
Kuperman, the government of the United States would not have
known that genocide was taking place until about April 20." 7 Thus,
even if the United States had been disposed to intervene, the
necessary orders could not have been given before that date.
According to Kuperman, if such orders had been given on April 20, a
force large enough to act throughout Rwanda could not have
completed its deployment from the United States until about May 30,
given the inaccessibility of Rwanda except by air, the limited capacity
of the airport at Kigali, and the number of troops and weight of
equipment to be transported. 1 8
While operations would have
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commenced before all troops were assembled, and large-scale
genocide could have been stopped perhaps as early as May 15,
Kuperman estimates that such an operation would have saved only
twenty-five percent of those who were actually murdered.1 1 9 A
somewhat quicker deployment would have been possible if the
objectives of the forces deployed were more limited than that of
halting the genocide throughout Rwanda; however, fewer persons
20
would have been saved.'
A second example is provided by a hypothetical deployment
suggested in a study of the airlift needs of the American military. 12 '
The writer hypothesized a deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division
to eastern Zaire. 122 His calculations showed that, using the most
capable American cargo aircraft, the C-17, it would take
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approximately twenty days to accomplish this deployment; if for some
reason sufficient C-17's were unavailable, the deployment could take
123
as long as thirty days.
One further point is relevant in this connection. The resources
necessary for quick intervention are not evenly distributed among
states. Aside from Russia, whose current capacity for long-distance
military intervention is not likely to be great, only the United States
maintains a sizeable fleet of transport aircraft capable of longdistance movement. Currently, the 360 American aircraft mentioned
above 124 represent something more than ninety percent of the longdistance air transport fleet of all the NATO states. 125 Not only is
long-distance movement dependent on the vagaries of airport
capacities; it is also an operation that can be performed by only one
state.
The point by now is clear. It is simply not physically possible to
move large military units instantaneously. If preventing a given
massive human rights violation would require very quick movement
of troops to a very remote area, preventing the human rights
violation might not be possible and would in any case be possible only
for the United States.
Recognition of this situation necessarily complicates formulating
any legal rule requiring action against evil. While some of these
difficulties are best discussed below, it is appropriate to note some of
the implications of these problems in execution. Legal rules are
supposed to indicate what behavior is required, permitted, or
forbidden in clearly designated categories of circumstances. If a set
of circumstances is incapable of categorization, it would seem badly
suited to legal regulation.
It would seem that the determinations of whether and how to
launch a major military operation is a classic instance of a matter
that does not lend itself to legal categorization. Assuming no rule
would be interpreted as requiring an action which was literally
impossible-such as moving a division from the United States to
Rwanda in twenty-four hours-the judgment calls involved seem
badly suited to any sort of legal analysis. Suppose, for example, a
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government declined to intervene in a particular situation because it
concluded that even the slightest chance of success would require
commitment of at least a division, but transportation and logistical
problems were judged to make deployment of more than a brigade
impossible.
Would a judge attempt to second-guess the
determination that only a division was adequate to the task at hand?
Would a prosecutor try to argue that the logistical difficulties were in
fact not as daunting as the state in question had concluded? What
would count as a violation of the rule? Would a decision that action
was impossible, made in good faith but debatable, be a basis for a
legal challenge?
In sum, consideration of a requirement of international action
against evil makes little sense if one considers the difficulties of
implementing the duty or of determining in concrete cases what
counts as compliance with the duty.

IV. VALUE CONFLICTS
The discussion thus far has shown that a rule of international
law requiring states to prevent massive human rights violations in
other states is not supported by authority, and that such a rule, as
well as any effort to establish the ICC, would encounter serious
problems of implementation. In addition to these difficulties, these
rules also would conflict with other rules of international law. This
section explores those conflicts.
A. Reacting to Evil Versus Article 2(4)
The most obvious conflict is between Article 2(4) of the Charter
and the concept of humanitarian intervention. Article 2(4) seeks to
prevent interstate uses of force; humanitarian intervention involves
interstate use of force in what is supposed to be a good cause. This
conflict would be particularly acute if it becomes legitimate to argue
that there exists a duty of humanitarian intervention. If. as the
report to the United Nations on the Rwanda genocide states, "the
United Nations-and in particular the Security Council and troop
contributing countries-must be prepared to act to prevent acts of
genocide or gross violations of human rights wherever they may take
place,"1 26 then states have an obligation, not merely an option, to use
force as needed for humanitarian reasons. The conflict is particularly
acute because of the uncertain character of any obligation to
intervene. If gross violations of human rights other than genocide
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trigger a duty to act, the occasions for intervention will be relatively
numerous. Further, if the obligation is one of prevention, there is an
obvious argument that early intervention is to be encouraged. In this
context, however, early intervention would be justified, not by the
occurrence of gross violations of human rights, but by the argument
that such gross violations would have taken place but for the
intervention. Even if there were agreement on what should count as
a gross violation of human rights, the prevention rationale could have
troubling consequences. Obviously, prevention is most successful if
there occurs no wrongdoing whatsoever. That observation suggests
that any intervention in a state that has seen, at worst, limited
human rights violations could be portrayed as a particular triumph,
with the intervenor claiming that chaos was averted only by the
intervention. Refuting this claim would require showing that no
large scale human rights violations would have taken place in any
event-an argument that cannot be made with confidence in many
situations.
For example, consider the intervention in Grenada in 1983 by
the United States and a number of other states in the region. That
action was prompted by a military coup by a hardline Marxist faction
in Grenada. 12 7 The coup aroused U.S. concern because of the
ideology of the new government and because of fears that a U.S.
failure to act, coming as it would on the heels of the bombing of the
Marine barracks in Beirut, would have suggested weakness on the
part of the United States. The neighboring states shared the U.S.
concern with the new government's ideology, and were also revolted
by the violence employed in the coup. 128 In other words, the motives
of the intervenors were to a great extent, though not exclusively,
ideological.
Suppose, however, that the United States and the other
intervenors had argued, in 1983, that this unusually violent coup,
coupled with the hardline character of the new government, raised
fears that the coup would be followed by massive violations of the
human rights of Grenadans generally, thereby not merely permitting
but obliging other states to overthrow that new government.
Opponents of the intervention could have questioned whether the
invasion was in fact disinterested, but would have been hard put to
argue that human rights violations would not have occurred. Yet if
no such argument could have been made, and a duty to prevent such
violations existed, then the legality of the intervention would have
been difficult to challenge.
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This dilemma is somewhat exacerbated by the Rome Statute.
Article 86 of that instrument imposes on States Parties a general
duty to cooperate with the ICC.129 That duty is certainly not defied
as extending to invading other states in order to capture persons
indicted. Further, it would appear that the Statute takes cognizance
of a failure to cooperate only when that failure follows an explicit
request for cooperation from the Court; the only response to such
failures specified in the Statute is a reference from the ICC to the
Assembly of States Parties or, in matters referred by the Security
Council, to the Security Council. 130 It might be further argued that,
in light of Article 103 of the UN Charter, giving obligations under the
Charter priority over obligations under all other international
instruments, 131 the duty to cooperate with the ICC could not trump
states' obligations under the Charter.
This argument for the primacy of the Charter, however, is hard
to reconcile with those arguments which subordinate states' duties
under Article 2(4) to humanitarian imperatives, even when no treaty
explicitly creates either a right or a duty to invade a state in order to
prevent gross human rights violation. If violations of 2(4) are
justified for humanitarian reasons even without a treaty obligation,
would such violations not be even easier to justify when such
obligations exist?
The problem here is not that the Rome Statute will be invoked to
drive unwilling states to war. The difficulty, rather, is that it will
provide a pretext for states desirous of invading other states for
reasons unrelated to humanitarian goals. In that context, the fact
that the Statute provides no penalties for failures to cooperate with
the ICC is beside the point. The issue is not inducing cooperation,
but restraining states only too eager to "cooperate."
Finally, objections can be raised against any proposed deviation
from Article 2(4): that war is in itself an evil that outweighs
whatever other evils it may be intended to prevent, and alternatively,
that even if categories of just wars can be envisaged, to recognize
such categories is to open the door to bad faith reliance on them to
justify otherwise proscribed uses of force.
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B. Reacting to Evil Versus Self-determination
Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights 1 32 and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights 1 33 provides:
1.

All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that
right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

3.

The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those
having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self.
Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of
the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in
conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United
34

Nations.1

This right of self-determination has arguably entered customary
international law. 135 Although the boundaries of the right are most
unclear, 136 even the narrowest construction of the term would
presumably read it as protecting the inhabitants of a recognized state
from being subjected to political control by persons not deriving their
authority from that state.
Institutionalizing
humanitarian
intervention
and
the
establishment of an ICC would undermine the principle of selfdetermination in three distinct ways. First, the states likely to be the
object of international enforcement actions are smaller third-world
states. Legitimating humanitarian intervention would thus, in a
sense, recreate the world in which powerful states respected one
another's sovereignty while ignoring that of weaker polities. Second,
such actions would forcibly replace local authority with alien control
in particular cases. Third, the rationale for these international legal
doctrines has the potential to destroy the intellectual underpinnings
of the concept of self-determination.
The first of these points is the easiest to establish.

As shown

above, the type of response evoked by a particular violation of human
rights depends, not simply on the character of the violation, but on
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the identity of the state in which the violation is taking place.
Regarding humanitarian intervention, Yugoslavia, a weak state and
a pariah in its region, received harsh treatment. The sovereignty of
Russia and Indonesia-both powerful and important states-was
respected. In this connection, Professor Greenwood's rejection of "an
interpretation of international law which would forbid intervention to
prevent something as terrible as the Holocaust '137 rings somewhat
hollow. It is most unlikely that a contemporary state as powerful as
was Nazi Germany in the 1930s and 1940s, and not already at war,
would find itself the object of forcible intervention, no matter how
horrible the human rights violations it perpetrated.
The writ of the ICC is also unlikely to run equally to all states.
Although the jurisdiction of the ICC extends to all states who become
parties to the Rome Statute without distinction, the strongest
states-the United States, Russia, and China-are most unlikely to
become parties. In such a case, crimes committed by the nationals of
these states would fall within the ICC's jurisdiction only if carried out
on the territory of a state party. More to the point, nationals of these
states accused of such crimes could be brought before the Court only
if they ventured onto the territory of a state party and that state
party was willing to risk the displeasure of the home state of the
accused by effecting an arrest. Thus, in practice, the states whose
nationals are most likely to appear before the ICC are the same
states likely to be the objects of humanitarian intervention.
The second sense in which international regulation of evil
obscures the concept of self-determination also is easily
demonstrated. In the words of the General Assembly's Declaration
on Friendly Relations, self-determination is defined as not being
subject to "alien

.

.

.

domination."'138

A duty to carry out

humanitarian intervention imposed by international law amounts to
alien domination, in that it deprives communities of control of one of
the most basic imaginable political decisions: whether to go to war.
Proponents of this duty would say to the inhabitants of states that in
cases of threats to humanitarian values, they are obliged to sacrifice
their lives and those of their children to the extent necessary to end
the threat. The scope of this claim is breathtaking. At the level of
political philosophy, it would seem the antithesis of selfdetermination to take from the hands of a group so crucial a decision.
It might be added that such a duty would be contrary to the values of
many peoples; while many religions and ethical systems praise

137.
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persons who sacrifice themselves for others, few if any consider
persons who do not risk their lives for the benefit of strangers as
failing in their duty.
Humanitarian intervention subjects persons to alien rule in an
additional context. As shown above, humanitarian intervention in a
territory will very frequently be followed by a period of international
administration of the territory, as the intervening states or other
organizations seek to address the circumstances which led to the
intervention. During this period, the people involved are governed by
outsiders. For example, accounts of the current UN efforts in East
Timor 139 and in Kosovo 140 make clear that, temporarily at least, local
people have very limited roles in their own government.
The ICC's authority to determine whether a state's prosecution
or investigation of an individual was "genuine" 141 can also have the
effect of substituting international control of the state's judicial
process for local control. If the ICC notifies a state of its intention to
proceed against an individual, then the state must begin an
investigation of that individual within a month, or the ICC seizes
jurisdiction of the matter. In such a case, there appears to be no way
142
the state can oust the ICC of authority in the matter.
It might be argued that such international administration is the
lesser evil in cases of humanitarian intervention, because either the
intervention itself, as in Kosovo, or the events which provoked the
intervention, as in East Timor, may have destroyed whatever
government structures formerly existed. The same argument cannot
be made regarding the ICC, however, because that body's authority
depends only on a territorial state's failure to prosecute or investigate
a crime, not simply on its inability to do so.
There is an additional and more speculative concern regarding
humanitarian intervention in particular cases, and it relates not so
much to the right of self-determination as to its necessity. There may
be conflicts that cannot be resolved until the parties have exhausted
their capacities to rely on violence. 143 In such cases, the argument
goes, halting violence may actually inhibit resolution of the conflict,
because the basis for disagreement for the parties will persist until
some or all of the actors acknowledge their inability to prevail by
force. 144 If such cases exist, intervention merely postpones an
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inevitable reckoning; it delays rather than prevents the human rights
violations it seeks to forestall.
Beyond difficulties in particular cases, however, the idea of
international intervention to prevent human rights abuses and to
punish violators of human rights assumes that international
standards and institutions may properly displace domestic standards
and institutions in circumstances determined at the international
level. Proponents of such intervention might argue that, while this
statement may be true in the sense that an intervention that, for
example, ousts a brutal dictatorship can be said to interfere with a
local institution, the sorts of activities against which interventions
and ICC proceedings would be directed would be illegitimate even
under local standards. That is, international action would be taken
only in cases so extreme that it is difficult to imagine objections from
nationals of the state that is the target of the intervention.
This argument fails, however, in that it confuses practical
limitations with legal limits on discretion. It is certainly true that
currently few major powers would be likely to intervene without the
justification of truly barbarous acts. Likewise, though the definition
of crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute is fairly vague, 145 it
would be surprising if the ICC were to go out of its way to read that
term broadly. The point, however, is that nothing limits the
discretion of intervening states or of the ICC.
One danger this situation presents is that practices generally
considered lawful in a given state may be challenged as oppressive,
either by humanitarian intervenors or by the ICC. For example, the
Rome Statute forbids persecution of members of groups on the
grounds of gender 146-meaning sex' 47-and defines "persecution" as
"the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights
contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the
group .... ,148 Could it be argued that the various discriminations
against women established in the law of certain Islamic states meet
this definition? 149 More precisely, could it conclusively be established
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that such discrimination does not meet that definition? It is difficult
to answer this second question in the affirmative. But failing an
affirmative answer, neither external intervention nor ICC action
could be considered legally precluded, assuming the establishment of
both a duty of humanitarian intervention and of the ICC.
The third threat that humanitarian intervention poses for selfdetermination-the conceptual conflict between the right of selfdetermination and the international control of evil-runs deeper. In
essence, permitting such control at the international level amounts to
the assertion that leaders of governments are, in the final analysis,
primarily accountable to the international community, not to the
citizens of the state that they govern. If the international community
may define the content of gross human rights violations and
overthrow by force a government engaged in such violations, even
when that government acts with the full consent of the majority of its
people, principles of popular control of government are necessarily
treated as less important than whatever human rights principles the
government has violated. Again, the ICC need not respect a local
decision to grant amnesties to persons arguably guilty of serious
human rights violations; 150 to that extent, local control of local
affairs, even if exercised reasonably and in good faith, need not be
respected by this non-local institution.
This point bears some emphasis because an objection to human
rights enforcement on the grounds of interference with local decision
making is frequently dismissed as simply a talking point for
dictators. In many cases, of course, that is true. But the principle
that international rules and institutions can ignore local authority
when those international institutions deem such action appropriate
has no necessary limit.
The states vulnerable to this sort of interference, at least under
the Rome Statute, are almost sure to be states that have chosen to
subject themselves to such treatment. This follows because the ICC's
jurisdiction is limited to crimes that were committed in the territory
of States Parties or by nationals of States Parties, or that have been
referred to the Court by the Security Council. 151 In the case of a
crime covered by a local amnesty, as for example crimes committed
by dictatorships formerly governing various states, the odds are very
high that the alleged perpetrator will be a national of the state where
alleged took place "as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population." This document also states, however, that the attack "need not
constitute a military attack." Id. at 9. The uncertainty noted above thus remains.
150.
John T. Holmes, The Principleof Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS,
RESULTS 41, 77 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT].
151.
Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 12, 13.
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the crime was committed and that granted the amnesty. In such a
case, the ICC could hear the case only if that state itself had become
a party to the Rome Statute, leaving aside the unlikely situation
where the Security Council refers a matter to the Court in such
circumstances.
This limitation, however, need not persist. The provisions of the
Rome Statute governing the ICC's jurisdiction clearly embrace the
principle that the ICC may exercise jurisdiction notwithstanding the
absence of consent from the state of the defendant's nationality.
Under the Statute, the Court could exercise jurisdiction in such a
case if the crime had been committed within the territory of a State
Party. In essence, the admitted jurisdiction of the state where the
crime took place is transferred, through that state's adherence to the
Statute, to the ICC. But if states may transfer to the ICC jurisdiction
based on a crime having been committed in their territories or by
their nationals, presumably they may also transfer jurisdiction
grounded on other bases. International law recognizes that criminal
jurisdiction may be exercised by states unrelated to the crime or the
criminal on the basis of universal jurisdiction-that is, jurisdiction
based on the crime being of universal concern.1 52 Although the
suggestion that the ICC should be able to exercise universal
jurisdiction was rejected at the Rome Conference, 5 3 nothing in the
Rome Statute prevents the ICC's jurisdiction from being expanded by
an amendment that would, in effect, transfer to the ICC such
universal jurisdiction as the parties to the Statute should choose to
vest in it. Such a development would permit the ICC to pass on the
domestic responses to universal jurisdiction crimes in any state
whatsoever.
The point here is not that the Rome Statute is likely to be
amended to bring about such a result, but rather to make clear that
international law has come to include concepts that, if combined,
would permit international institutions to override domestic decisions
made by states that have not even consented to the authority of such
institutions. International law, therefore, seems to be moving toward
accepting the principle that governments derive their just powers
from the consent, not of the governed, but of the international
community. It is hard to see how the right of self-determination
could survive the acceptance of such a principle.

152.
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1987).
153.
Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE I"TERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 150, at 127, 132-39.
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C. Reacting to Evil: Conclusion
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that both the idea of a
duty of humanitarian intervention and the structure of the ICC
conflict with other fundamental principles of international law. Of
course, the fact that legal principles may conflict with one another is
hardly startling. Legal institutions must frequently resolve such
conflicts. In such cases, it is necessary to consider the rationales of
each of the conflicting principles in order to decide which should
control. The next section of this Article, then, takes a close look at
the rationales for both a duty of humanitarian intervention and for
the creation of an ICC. As will be seen, the problem with both ideas
is not that they conflict with other legal principles, but that their
rationales for institutionalizing international responses to evil is
surprisingly weak.

V. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RULES REQUIRING RESPONSES
TO EVIL: WHY?

A. Why Have Rules Requiring Response to Evil: Introduction
The discussion has thus far examined the twin propositions that
states have a legal obligation to prevent massive human rights
violations and that persons alleged to be responsible for such
violations should be subject to international prosecution, at least if
neither prosecuted nor cleared by a state. As has been shown, the
first of these propositions is unsupported by authority (the second
would be implemented only pursuant to a treaty). Further, both
propositions raise significant problems of practical application, and
both conflict with other significant principles of international law.
The most fundamental issue, however, remains to be addressed:
why would it be a good idea for international law to establish
obligations and institutions intended to suppress evil? At first blush,
the question seems silly. Evil is, well, evil. Is not the desirability of
combating evil self evident?
Reflection, however, raises doubts about that conclusion. Before
one can act confidently against evil, one must be able to identify it.
What counts as evil? While there will of course be some fairly easy
determinations-the Nazi genocides, the genocides in Rwanda and
Bangladesh-there will also be some difficult cases. Was the atomic
bombing of Hiroshima justified?
What about the bombing of
Nagasaki? The idea of international law requiring a response to evil
assumes that the international legal system has developed a clear
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and legitimate method of identifying evil and thus dealing with the
difficult cases. Is this assumption justified?
In addition to the question of determining what counts as evil, a
second issue must be confronted: who should decide what to do about
an evil? Some possible responses to evil-for example, attacking
Russia to force it to modify its tactics in Chechnya-would arguably
cause more harm than the actions they seek to forestall. Because
choices must be made between reactions to evil, someone must make
the choices. The idea that international law requires a response to
evil assumes that the choices should ultimately be made at the
international level. Does that assumption withstand analysis?
This Section of the Article addresses these two concerns. It
seeks to show that the two assumptions described in the preceding
paragraphs are problematic at best.
B. Identifying Evil
How can it be determined whether a particular practice is evil
enough to justify either humanitarian intervention or classification
as a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute? As noted
above, 154 no clear standards exist to answer this question. Yet the
idea of requiring international responses to evil and establishing a
criminal court to punish particular acts assumes that standards can
not only be articulated, but can be fairly applied to all states and all
persons. What is the source of the belief that such universal
standards exist?
Making such determinations would be easy if all peoples had
common views in this area. That is not the case, however. On the
contrary, there are immense differences among the peoples of the
world regarding very basic moral questions. Peoples differ as well in
their views of the international legal status of particular rules
intended to legalize particular moral views.
The legal and philosophical questions are not identical. Even
philosophers who derive principles of morality from natural law do
not argue that if an act is morally required, permitted, or prohibited,
it is-solely because of its moral status-necessarily legally required,
permitted, or prohibited. 155 Presumably everyone can imagine acts
he would classify as immoral, but that he would hesitate to make
illegal. Likewise, it is easy to identify rules that were clearly rules of
law but that could easily be branded immoral-such as the Jim Crow
laws that were formerly common in the southern United States.

154.
155.

See supratext accompanying notes 145-48.
ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 228 (1999).
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If the legal and philosophical inquiries are not identical,
however, neither are they unrelated. At the most basic level, laws
perceived by those they govern to flout moral requirements are
presumably less likely to be obeyed without coercion. In a world in
which the concept of alien domination has been so decisively rejected,
it is especially important to establish that legal rules intended to be
universally applicable are not seen as drawn from the value systems
of powerful states and simply forced on the less powerful.
In these circumstances, it is impossible to ignore differences in
moral conceptions among the different peoples of the world in
considering the justifiability of particular legal rules. To repeat,
those differences in moral conceptions are striking. Consider the
question of human sacrifice. It seems safe to predict that almost
everyone who reads this Article would regard that practice with
abhorrence. This reaction is not simply based on the fact that human
sacrifice necessarily involves killing a person in circumstances that
could probably be described as murder under Western definitions of
that term; rather, the disgust generated by the thought of human
sacrifice reflects as well the idea that such killings are utterly
wrongheaded, carried out for reasons of pure superstition and
possible only in an atmosphere of abject ignorance. Persons who are
devout followers of the monotheistic religions may add to these
feelings a reaction of horror at the thought that God would be pleased
rather than angered by such an offering.
All the world does not see human sacrifice in this way. Stephen
Ellis has shown that in Liberia human sacrifice, followed by
consumption of the flesh of the victim, is widely seen as an especially
effective means of acquiring spiritual power. 156 Acquisition of
spiritual power has significance far beyond the realm of religion
because all forms of earthly power, including the political, are seen as
157
entirely dependent on the spirit world.
A second example is provided by a controversy that figured
prominently a few years ago in U.S. law reviews. At that time, a
number of writers addressed the issue of female genital surgery as
practiced particularly in Africa. The debate revealed that a number
of Western writers simply assumed that the practice could only be
considered a species of torture, while a number of African writers
insisted upon the importance of an understanding of its cultural
context to any evaluation of the practice.' 58 African writers also
noted that Western criticism of this African practice existed despite

156.
See generally STEPHEN ELLIS, THE MASK OF ANARCHY: THE DESTRUCTION
OF LIBERIA AND THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF AN AFRICAN CIVIL WAR 220-80 (1999).

157.
Id.
158.
E.g., Colloquium, Bridging Society, Culture, and Law: The Issue of Remale
Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 263-552 (1997).
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the existence in the West of arguably comparable practices, such as
15 9
cosmetic surgery and circumcision of male infants.
One last example not only illustrates differences in moral
conceptions, but also reflects the interplay between moral principles
and legal rules. Life imprisonment is the maximum sentence
available to the International Criminal Tribunal established to
address violations of humanitarian law committed during the
Rwanda genocide. 160 Furthermore, under its Statute, the jurisdiction
of the International Tribunal for Rwanda takes precedence over that
of the courts of Rwanda.16 1 In Rwanda, however, not only is the
death penalty permitted, but that punishment is mandatory for
persons convicted of committing the most serious acts in the course of
the genocide. 162 In other words, the instruments establishing the
existing Rwanda tribunal render unavailable for persons convicted of
very serious crimes the penalty thought appropriate for those crimes
by the people of the state where the crimes took place. As Professor
Alvarez has pointed out, this situation has contributed to
dissatisfaction with the tribunal among Rwandans.16 3 He has also
noted that despite the doubtful legitimacy of refusing to apply to
crimes committed in Rwanda the penalties deemed appropriate by
Rwandans, this issue was not even expressly addressed when the
International Tribunal for Rwanda was established. Rather, it was
apparently simply taken for granted that the death penalty would not
be available, given the strong opposition to the death penalty among
international lawyers and human rights advocates,16 and despite the
difficulty of sustaining an argument that international law forbids
imposing the death penalty on perpetrators of genocide. 165
This discussion is not intended to suggest that human sacrifice,
female genital surgery, or the death penalty are necessarily
worthwhile institutions.1 66
But the existence of differences in
thinking about these issues demonstrates the distinctions among
peoples regarding their understandings of morality, and the

159.

L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades: Rethnhing Polemics and

Intransigence in the CampaignAgainst Female Circumcision, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
275, 318-20 (1997).

160.

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955,

U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. art. 23, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
161.
Id. art. 8.
162.
Alvarez, supranote 11, at 406-07.
163.
Id. at 407-08.
164.

Id. at 408-10.

165.

Id. at 408 n.215.

166. Indeed, even within Liberia, as Ellis points out, human sacrifice has
provoked criticism and criminal prosecution. ELLIS, supra note 156, at 220-23.
Likewise, there are certainly African women who oppose the practice of female genital
surgery. E.g., James T. Dixon, Introduction to Bridging Society, Culture, and Law:
The Issue ofFemale Circumcision,47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 263, 268-69 (1997).
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corresponding difficulty of any effort to globalize basic legal
standards. The difficulty is that establishing a unitary legal system
assumes unitary legal standards: a crime committed by a person in

one place is also a crime if committed by another person somewhere
else. To the extent that there exists a divergence in values among
the different societies of the world, acts that would be considered so
evil as to be criminal in one place may not be considered evil in

another. Even if an act is widely considered evil, differences in views
as to what counts as a justification of the act or as a mitigating
circumstance would necessarily affect assessments of the way in
which any particular occurrence of the act should be addressed by a
167
putative international system.
In the face of such examples, one might expect to encounter
justifications for the assumption that there exist universally
applicable standards in such matters. Regrettably, proponents of
universal standards provide remarkably little support for the
universal legitimacy of such standards. For instance, Professor
Donnelly sees the philosophical source of those rights in the concept
of human dignity, characterizing rights as those needs of human
beings that must be met to permit a life of dignity, the denial of

167.
The difficulties such situations can present have already manifested
themselves in the operations of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia. In Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, the Appeals Chamber of that Tribunal was
faced with the case of a defendant who had admitted to taking part in the massacre of
civilian prisoners captured by the Bosnian Serbs in the town of Srebrenica. Prosecutor
v. Erdemovic, Judgement, Case No. IT-96-22, ICTY Appeals Chamber (Oct. 7, 1997), at
http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/judgment/erd-aj971007e.htm (last visited Feb.
5, 2001). The defendant asserted, and the Tribunal accepted, that the defendant took
part in this atrocity only because he was reasonably convinced that he would have been
killed himself had he not done so. Id. para. 4. Further, the Tribunal accepted that the
defendant's refusal to take part would not have prevented the crime from being
committed. The Chamber was thus faced with the question whether the defense of
duress was available. Id. para. 16. Noting that common law jurisdictions did not allow
the defense in cases of murder, while civil law jurisdictions-including the former
Yugoslavia-did, the majority concluded that international law was uncertain on the
relevant point, and on policy grounds concluded that the defense should not be
available, though without clearly explaining why the policy behind the civil law rule
was so obviously inferior to the policy behind the common law rule or why the judges in
the majority saw themselves as empowered to prefer the approach taken by one of the
world's major legal systems over that taken by another major legal system. Prosecutor
v. Erdemovic, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, Case No.
IT-96-22, ICTY Appeals Chamber, paras. 67, 75-78, at http://www.un.org/icty/
erdemovic/appeal/judgment/erd-asojmcd971007e.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2001). This
approach was met by a vigorous dissent from Judge Cassese, who insisted that the
Tribunal had no authority to make policy judgments in such cases. If international law
was ambiguous, he argued, the Court should have applied the law of the former
Yugoslavia or, as a last resort, resolved doubts in favor of the accused. Prosecutor v.
Erdemovic, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Cassese, Case. No. IT-96-22,
ICTY Appeals Chamber, para. 49, at http://www.un.org/icty/erdemovic/appeal/
judgment/erd-adojcas971007e.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2001).
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which denies a person's humanity. 68 Professor Schachter similarly
asserts that "[p]olitical leaders, jurists[,] and philosophers have
increasingly alluded to the dignity of the human person as a basic
ideal so generally recognized as to require no independent
support."'169 Neither Donnelly nor Schachter explains how the idea of
one person's dignity creates rights that others are obliged to
respect. 170 The omission seems crucial because the fact that a
particular act would be inconsistent with respect for a person's
dignity does not establish an obligation on the part of another to
refrain from the act unless that other has a previous obligation to
respect that person's dignity. An invocation of dignity does not
advance the inquiry because the question is whether the other has
any obligations to that person at all. Surely expressions of opinion by
political leaders, jurists, and philosophers, without more, cannot
suffice to overcome the doubts of those whose opinions are dissimilar.
A different, but no less problematic, approach has been taken by
Professor Henkin. He justifies his claims regarding human rights by
reference to "some contemporary universal version of natural law,
whether religious or secular,by appeal to a common moral intuition of
human dignity."'171 Again, he does not explain how this justification
operates regarding persons whose intuitions differ from his.
Further, there are other, quite respectable, approaches to moral
questions that do not seek to derive answers to such questions from
assumptions about the moral nature of human beings. As has been
noted by Donnelly himself, some schools of psychology and sociology
reject the idea that beliefs about right and wrong have any
connection to ideas concerning the nature of humans. Utilitarianism
grounds its analysis of morals on concepts of social welfare, and of
course, there is a long history throughout the world, of grounding
beliefs about right and wrong in the commands of God, rather than in
the nature of humans. 72 Indeed, Islam does not merely ground its
approach to morals in divine commandments, but rejects the
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JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN' RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 16.
21 (1989).
169.
Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normatwe Concept, 77 AM. J. I,.rL
L. 848, 848-49 (1983).
170.
Donnelly has subsequently acknowledged that other philosophical
perspectives are inconsistent with the idea of rights inhering in individuals simply
because they are human, at least outside a religious context. JACK DONNELLY.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 20-22 (2d ed. 1998).
171.
Louis Henkin, Human Rights: Religious or Enlightened?, in REUGIO" AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPETING CLAIMS? 31, 35 (Carrie Gustafson & Peter Juviler eds.,
1999).
172.
See DONNELLY, supranote 168, at 20-22.
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possibility of humans determining the proper way to live without the
173
guidance of God.
Rather than seek to show the philosophical basis for claims of
universal validity of rights arguments, proponents of universal ideas
of rights tend to point to the broad acceptance by states of human
rights principles. Donnelly, for example, asserts:
We thus have a considerable variety of possible moral justifications, as
well as an array of theories that deny or radically devalue human rights
....
I will assume that there are human rights, that is, that we have
accepted some sort of philosophical defense. This theoretical evasion is
justified by the fact that almost all states acknowledge the existence of
1 74
human rights.

In essence, Donnelly relies on the acts of governments to justify
a philosophical position, rather than demonstrating the correctness of
a philosophical position in order to develop a standard for evaluating
the acts of governments. One difficulty with this approach is that it
makes universal rights, which are supposed to constrain
governments regardless of their consent, in fact dependent upon
governmental consent. Aside from this contradiction, this approach
makes the solidity of the argument for the existence of rights
contingent on continued acceptance by governments.
This is a serious problem because Donnelly overstates the extent
that governments see themselves as constrained by human rights
norms. To be sure, very large numbers of states have become parties
to treaties requiring adherence to a broad range of human rights. 175
The actual scope of these obligations, however, is difficult to specify.
Violations of such obligations are quite common, 176 but, while such
violations may draw criticism from other parties to the treaties, they
rarely evoke any stronger reaction. Violations of these treaties, in
other words, do not produce the consequences one would expect if the
norms violated were seen as international legal obligations. Further,
the treaties themselves contain no provisions regarding actual
enforcement. While several treaties include provisions under which
States Parties may permit individuals to bring claims against them
before the bodies established to monitor observance of the treaties,
states routinely ignore the disposition of such complaints by the
treaty-monitoring bodies. 177 In short, the sense in which states have
"acknowledged the existence of human rights" is not clear.
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Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl. para. d, reprinted in
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DONNELLY, supra note 168, at 22.
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A.M. Weisburd, Implications of International Relations Theory for the
InternationalLaw of Human Rights, 38 COLUIN1. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 45, 53-55 (1999).
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Id. at 55-57.
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The foregoing obligations highlight the problems with the
arguments for the philosophical basis for human rights. Unable to
establish such a basis on grounds that in fact would be universally
accepted, proponents of human rights seek to avoid the problem by
stressing states' actual acceptance of obligations. Upon examination,
however, the degree of such acceptance seems unclear. There
remains, therefore, no clear, uncontroversial philosophical basis for a
system of universal rights.
While this is, of course, an undesirable situation, one could
imagine that the states of the world had agreed to bind themselves to
certain human rights principles, notwithstanding differences in
reasons for accepting those principles. In fact, however, the legal
status of human rights rules is also uncertain.
States' apparent indifference to their obligations under human
rights treaties, discussed above, may or may not raise questions
about the legal status of the treaties themselves. Clearly, however,
this record of state practice raises difficulties for any argument that
human rights norms have become rules of customary international
law. In one sense, there is little dispute on this point. No one
contends that states generally respect human rights in the belief that
international law requires them to do so. Nor do those who argue
that human rights norms have nonetheless become rules of
customary international law deny that a rule of customary
international law cannot exist unless evidenced by state practice
actually reflecting the rule. Those supporting the customary law
status of human rights norms avoid this seeming contradiction by
labeling as "state practice regarding human rights" certain acts
which do not by themselves involve actually respecting human rights.
The argument is phrased in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States as follows:
Practice accepted as building customary human rights law includes:
virtually universal adherence to the United Nations Charter and its
human rights provisions, and virtually universal and frequently
reiterated acceptance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
even if only in principle; virtually universal participation of states in
the preparation and adoption of international agreements recognizing
human rights principles generally, or particular rights; the adoption of
human rights principles by states in regional organizations in Europe.
Latin America, and Africa (see Introductory Note to this Part); general
support by states for United Nations resolutions declaring, recognizing,
invoking, and applying international human rights principles as
international law; action by states to conform their national law or
practice to standards or principles declared by international bodies, and
the incorporation of human rights provisions, directly or by reference,
in national constitutions and laws; invocation of human rights
principles in national policy, in diplomatic practice, in international
organization activities and actions; and other diplomatic
communications or action by states reflecting the view that certain
practices violate international human rights law. including
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condemnation and other adverse state reactions to violations by other
178
states.

An alternative approach is to evade the absence or ambiguity of
state practice by labeling a rule as "emerging." For example,
Professor Franck, in an effort to show that there exists an emerging
rule of international law requiring states to adopt a democratic form
of government, supports his claim by reference to forms of practice
not actually supportive of his conclusion. He places great weight on
the increasingly common practice of states, particularly those moving
from undemocratic to democratic systems of government, of making
requests to international bodies for electoral observers to vouch for
the fairness of an election. 179 He also notes that the European Union
insists that states seeking membership have democratic forms of
government. 180 To be sure, he mentions that states have criticized
United Nations electoral monitoring even when requested by the
state holding the elections and acknowledges that "any effort to
transform an election monitoring option, exercisable at the discretion
of each government, into an obligation owed by each government to
its own people and to the other States of the global community is
likely to be resisted."'18 1 He then goes on to suggest, however, that a
voluntary rule "may" seem less fair and have less legitimacy than an
obligation, to invoke "the natural right of all people to liberty and
democracy," and to note the difficulty populations may have in
overthrowing despotic governments. 182 He also relies on various nonbinding statements issued by individual states and by international
organizations which, while certainly supporting the conclusion that
states' internal political arrangements are matters of international
concern, certainly do not purport to establish a legal requirement of
democracy.1 8 3 Professor Franck relies on these examples of states
voluntarily submitting to international monitoring, choices not to
enter into treaty relations with other states, non-binding assertions
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20011

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

of principle, and natural law as a basis for predicting that collective
international actions taken to compel states to respect democracy
"are likely to be generally welcomed." 184
There is obviously a very large gap between requesting
international assistance and submitting to international control.
Fortified by his reference to natural law, however, Franck leaps that
gap. In doing so, he ignores a large body of evidence contradicting his
conclusion, 185 reinforcing the supposition that states' actual
willingness to submit to control on this point is not, in Professor
Franck's view, controlling.
The difficulty with the approaches of the Restatement and
Professor Franck is, as Professor Kelly has pointed out, that
"[c]ustomary norms are social facts perceived as normatively required
by the community, not the creation of experts." 186 He adds that the
methods of determining customary international law exemplified by
the approaches of the Restatement or Professor Franck are not based
187
on the inductive method and cannot be justified as a social fact.
That is, these authorities seem to examine almost everything except
whether states actually respect human rights-in the case of the
Restatement-or whether states in fact see themselves as obliged to
organize themselves democratically-in the case of Professor Franck.
Similarly, Professors Alston and Simma have noted serious flaws in
the argument that the sorts of behavior on which Professor Franck
and the Restatement rely can create rules of customary law.' 8 8
In short, both the philosophical and legal bases of claims for the
universality of the values embodied in international human rights
rules seem uncertain. It remains undetermined why respected
scholars nonetheless insist on the validity of their philosophical and
legal positions regarding rights.
C. The Rationale for Internationalization
Suppose that somehow the points made in the foregoing section
could be addressed-that is, that some set of values could be
identified, and that the importance of enforcing those values was
universally agreed. The question of how that enforcement should be
carried out would remain to be addressed. One possible answer to
that question is to deal with the matter at the international level:

184.
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enact a rule of international law which would require, in the case of
massive human rights violations, that other states intervene with
force, if no other method would serve to end the human rights
violations.
With respect to individuals responsible for such
violations, one could establish a permanent international court, ready
to act if governments fail to do so for reasons the international court
considers inadequate. This portion of the discussion examines these
answers to the question of how the world should respond to massive
evil.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that the superiority of an
international level approach to these matters is not obvious.
Professor Alvarez, in a very thoughtful article, has identified a
number of problems with assuming such superiority. 8 9 He suggests
that the triumph of global institutions is not inevitable, and that
existing institutions have hardly met the most ambitious goals of
their supporters. 190 He notes skepticism from a number of quarters
as to the truly universal character of the values these international
institutions espouse. 19 1 Alvarez stresses their lack of accountability,
and the serious flaws in the operation of certain existing
supranational bodies, casting doubt on the assumption of the
192
superiority, at least in those cases.
Certainly, the rationales for the particular sorts of international
control addressed in this article seem quite weak. With regard to the
argument in favor of an international rule requiring humanitarian
intervention, this point is made clearer if one examines the purposes
such a rule could serve.
An argument that such a rule is needed to permit humanitarian
interventions is clearly false. Any violation of human rights massive
enough to trigger calls for intervention is likely to be characterized as
a threat to international peace and security. As such, the Security
Council would be permitted to take whatever action it thought proper
in response. 193 The NATO intervention in Kosovo and the ECOWAS
interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone show that states will,
under at least some circumstances, carry out such interventions even
if the Security Council does not act. A change in law is thus not
needed simply to allow interventions to go forward. Conversely, if
the Security Council were to conclude that an ostensibly
humanitarian intervention was nonetheless a violation of the
Charter, that determination would presumably be conclusive,
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notwithstanding any claims intervenors might make regarding their
duties under international law.
Any other conclusion seems
impossible to square with the Charter.
Thus, it would appear that the hypothetical rule would be
relevant only if the Security Council had neither authorized nor
condemned humanitarian intervention in a particular case and if no
state appeared willing to act in that case. Then what role would a
legal rule play in such circumstances? Would states, seeing the
inaction of the Security Council, and of other states, consider the
situation serious enough to act? More importantly, would the
political considerations that inhibited states' willingness to act be
outweighed by arguments based on an abstract legal rule? If some
entity disadvantaged by the absence of intervention were to rely on
the rule as the basis for a claim against a non-intervening state, and
in the unlikely event that some tribunal would entertain the claim,
how could the judges assess the claim? Since, by hypothesis, the
issue could arise only if international law has come to recognize a
duty to intervene to prevent massive human rights violations, the
issue before the court would be primarily factual, or more precisely,
counter-factual. That is, the court would have to determine what
would have happened if the state in question had behaved differently.
If a state explained its failure to intervene by reference to practical
difficulties of obtaining intelligence and moving military units
adequate to affect the situation, would a tribunal really second-guess
a state on such technical military questions? Such a rule would
seem, in short, to be pointless.
The rationale for the ICC likewise seems unclear. As noted
above, other authors have raised serious doubts as to whether the
ICC will be able to accomplish the objectives its proponents have set
for it any better than those goals could be met by existing
institutions. That is, there is serious reason to doubt whether such
an institution would deter violations of human rights, or create a
historical record, or permit closure for the states involved or a sense
1 94
of vindication for victims and their survivors.
The Rome Statute and its proponents give particular prominence
to the objective of ending impunity for violators of human rights,195
but it is by no means clear how the establishment of the ICC can
further that goal, nor is it clear that the goal is always desirable. The
ICC will possess no police force and thus will rely entirely on states to
take into custody persons it seeks to try. In those circumstances, how
will it be able to obtain custody of persons who not only commit
horrific acts, but also retain positions of such power so as to be above
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the law within their own states? Since such states are hardly likely
either to become parties to the Rome Statute or to cooperate with the
ICC, there is reason to wonder whether the Court will have any
impact on the Saddam Husseins of the world. Second, it is by no
means obvious that ending impunity is necessarily a worthy objective
in every case. As has often been pointed out, if a wrong-doer can be
induced to surrender his power to do more wrong only by
undertakings that include promises of impunity, it is by no means
obvious that carrying out such promises cannot be justified. If
someone is not only willing and able to cause harm, but cannot be
prevented from causing harm if he chooses to do so, it can surely be
argued that removing that person from a position where he can do
more damage is more important than retaining the option of bringing
him to account for past wrongs.
As with the idea of seeking to establish a duty for states to
intervene to prevent humanitarian catastrophes, it thus is difficult to
see what concrete benefits would flow from the creation of an ICC.
Why then have quite distinguished people called for establishment of
such a duty and insisted on the importance of creating the ICC?
D. Speculations on Rationalesfor the ICC and for a Duty to Intervene
The foregoing sections have shown that it is difficult to justify,
either philosophically or legally, assertions of the universally binding
character of the values to be vindicated by humanitarian intervention
or by the ICC, and that it is hard to justify functionally either a rule
requiring humanitarian intervention or the establishment of the ICC.
The question thus presents itself: why then do so many people insist
on both the correctness of the values in question and the value of the
proposed international rule and of the ICC?
In considering these questions, it is helpful to start with the
reliance on natural rights and natural law by Professors Franck and
Henkin, and on Professor Reisman's reference to trans-empirical sources
of law. These scholars would, in effect, derive international law from
moral principles, rather than from the acts of human institutions. At
least implicitly, this approach rejects any suggestion that law is a social
institution created by human beings, and argues instead that human
beings are legally obliged to obey rules that they did not create and
cannot alter. These scholars, after all, are not merely arguing that it
would be a good thing if states were to seriously institutionalize a body
of human rights rules, but are insisting that those rules are already
universally binding, despite the disagreements from a number of schools
of philosophy and the ambiguity of the legalities of the matter under
conventional legal analysis. Their position, in short, seems most
accurately characterized as a matter of faith.
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Other writers have noted the similarity between religious
convictions and the attitudes of those insisting on the high
significance of human rights rules in international law. 196 Perhaps it
is some notion that human rights principles are a sort of revealed
truth that explains the willingness of supporters of these principles to
insist on their primacy over all other principles whatsoever, including
those of religion. Such an attitude may explain Professor Henkin's
apparent insistence that religion is to be evaluated according to the
degree it is compatible with human rights principles, rather than
197
seeking to justify human rights principles by reference to religion.
To the same effect is Professor Mayer's analysis of the conflicts
between Islamic law and international human rights standards. 198
Professor Mayer acknowledges that many Muslim countries have
entered reservations to a number of human rights conventions, a
circumstance that complicates any analysis of the content of the
human rights obligations those states may be said to have assumed
on the basis of consent. 199 Yet Professor Mayer's clear assumption
that those reservations have no effect on the legal obligations of those
states, together with her reliance upon the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, suggests that she would derive the legal obligations
on which she relies from non-treaty sources.2 00 As pointed out above,
however, the basis for claims of the legal status of human rights rules
outside the treaty context is rather weak, and best understood as
faith based. In other words, Professor Mayer takes the somewhat
paradoxical position that Muslims are obliged to subordinate what
they understand to be the commands of God to a body of rules whose
justification depends on a faith Muslims do not share.
But if what we are encountering is something akin to a religious
faith urged to be a source of law, it seems reasonable to inquire who
the interpreters of this faith are-whose views may be seen as
exemplifying these principles that all states, and presumably all
persons, are obliged to share? As others have pointed out, the
relevant views seem to be those of international lawyers and non20 l
governmental organizations (NGOs) supportive of human rights.
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As Professor Sohn asserted, with a surprising degree of frankness, "I
submit that states really never make international law on the subject
of human rights. It is made by the people that care; the professors,
the writers of textbooks and casebooks, and the authors of articles in
leading international law journals."20 2 In other words, human rights
principles are law because many international lawyers think they
ought to be.
A similar explanation may account for the support that many
scholars have shown for the ideas of requiring humanitarian
intervention and for the ICC. Certainly, there is an important
current of opinion among scholars of international law that
subordinating states to the international community is a desirable
end in itself, without regard to the effects of such a policy in
particular cases. For example, Professor Hathaway decries the U.S.
refusal to adhere to the recently concluded treaty banning
landmines 20 3 and its "resistance to most of the international human
rights project[s] ''20 4 and describes with disapproval the unwillingness
of the United States to subscribe to a "multilateralism of a kind that
either defines or enforces basic values ....,,205 Yet nowhere does he
assert that U.S. practices regarding human rights are somehow
generally inferior to those of the rest of the world, or that the United
States is a significant contributor to the problems that the landmines
convention was intended to address.
Indeed, in that latter
connection, Professor Malanczuk has noted that there is in fact little
or nothing objectionable in the actual practice of the United States as
regards those weapons. 20 6 Again, Professor Lobel has stated that
"the real test of the twenty-first century will be to find ways to
strengthen international institutions and to subject all nations, even
hegemonic ones, to the rule of law. ' 20 7 Other scholars similarly have
affirmed the inherent desirability of subsuming states within an
over-arching international system. 20 8 Indeed, some would appear to
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believe that such a supranational system has in fact come into being.
Thus President McDonald of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia has characterized the task of her court as
ensuring "that those responsible for perpetrating, in the former
Yugoslavia, the most unspeakable affront to the dignity of
humankind are held accountable before the bar of humanity'
(emphasis added).20 9 Similarly, Adriaan Bos, Chairman of the
United Nations Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, has stated that "the point of classifying
an offense as a crime under international law is to express a
universal belief that certain crimes deserve punishment regardless of
who the perpetrator is within the international community, and that
210
a crime of this nature is an affront to the internationalcommunity"
(emphasis added).
The difficulty with this approach is that when it is applied to
concrete cases, its weaknesses become manifest. This point is
illustrated by considering the nature of Professor Alvarez's criticisms
of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. He has faulted
that institution as unlikely to preserve a collective memory of the
roles played by certain outside states in the genocide, because the
Tribunal is financially dependent on the Security Council.2 11 The
Security Council includes several of those states, and its bench
includes nationals of some of those states as well. 2 12 Collective
memory will also be poorly served by proceedings which necessarily
cannot deal with more than a few of a very large number of potential
defendants.2 1 3 Moreover, the Tribunals bench includes no Rwandans
despite the greater legitimacy within Rwanda that would be accorded
judgments from a court on which both Hutus and Tutsis were
seated. 214
He points out the likely negative consequences for
affirming the legitimacy of Rwanda's own legal system from the
international decision to deprive that system of authority to try the
most prominent defendants.2 15 He emphasizes the limited utility for
the survivors of the genocide of trials conducted in a foreign country,
in a foreign language, with no possibility for any local input into the
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process and no weight given to local views as to the appropriate
216
punishment for the crimes the Tribunal addresses.
Most readers are likely to agree that Professor Alvarez has
identified serious weaknesses in the assumptions underlying the
International Tribunal for Rwanda. It is crucial, however, to make
explicit the implications of that conclusion. To criticize the operation
of an international institution dealing with Rwanda on the grounds
that it poorly serves the interests of the people of Rwanda is to say
that those interests should be the prime focus of such an institution.
If that is true, then why are outside states justified in establishing
any tribunal, other than one entirely under the control of Rwanda?
Setting up such a body like the existing tribunal, with its complete
independence from Rwanda, makes sense only if the Rwanda
genocide is seen as an offense against all the world, not simply
against Rwanda-the view President McDonald apparently takes
regarding the various enormities perpetrated in the former
Yugoslavia. 2 17 If the offense is against the whole world, however,
why privilege the needs and values of Rwanda? In domestic criminal
prosecutions, after all, the focus is on applying the standards thought
appropriate by the whole community, speaking through its
legislature. It is by no means assumed that the needs and values of
the victim, or his survivors, ought to take precedence over those of
the community.
If Professor Alvarez's criticisms make sense, it is because we
believe, in fact, that the genocide in Rwanda was primarily a crime
against Rwandans, and only secondarily, if at all, against the
international community. Accordingly, we do not believe in the
existence of an international community whose interests supersede
those of the groups which comprise it. We do not believe that the
Rwandans have no more claim to control the treatment of those
guilty of genocide in that state than a domestic crime victim has to
demand the right to determine the punishment for the person who
victimized him.
If in concrete cases, we are uncomfortable with the consequences
of subordinating national control of problems to international and
supranational approaches, how then are we to account for the
apparently taken-for-granted assumptions of the superiority of
international approaches to massive evil, held by so many
distinguished people? Once again, an analogy to religion suggests
itself. As Professor Alvarez has stated:
International lawyers share an appealing evangelistic, even messianic,
agenda. We are on a mission to improve the human condition. For
many, perhaps most of us, this mission requires preferring the
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international "over the national, integration over sovereignty."
Multilateralism is our shared secular religion. Despite all of our
disappointments with its functioning, we still worship at the shrine of
218
global institutions like the UN.

While the tone of this passage is tongue-in-cheek, the point it
makes should not be dismissed out of hand. After all, if international
lawyers' insistence on the legal character of human rights principles
is best understood as akin to religious faith, as suggested above, it
would hardly be surprising if there were a similar basis for
international lawyers' almost knee-jerk assumption of the necessity
of regulating behavior by means of international law and of the
inherent superiority of international or supranational institutions to
any system which treats preservation of state sovereignty as
important.
Yet if the faith in institutions depends on assumptions we are
not prepared to make in concrete cases, as suggested by the
consideration of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the
faith in the principles those institutions seek to vindicate is likewise
suspect. If an international institution affecting a state can be
faulted for wrongly devaluing the interests of the people of that state,
why should international rules, antithetical to the values of a
particular group, be imposed on the group? Surely the values to be
vindicated by the institution are at least as crucial to the group in
question as is the identity of the persons making up the institution.
If we insist on the importance of the responsiveness of the institution
to the affected group, implicitly we admit the importance of according
primacy to local values over any which might be preferred by persons
acting at the international level. Once we make that admission, we
have questioned the legitimacy of any international approach to evil
other than one that is responsive to all the states in the world and
not imposed on any. At least, we are forced to question values and
institutions whose claims to superiority and universality seem to rest
on no more than mere assertion.
One may concede that international lawyers and members of
human rights groups are well-motivated and disinterested, at least in
a material sense, and still deny their right to make law for the world.
If the rationale, however, for particular legal rules and institutions
comes down simply to the international lawyers' belief that the rules
and institutions are inherently good, despite the different views of
other people, international lawyers are making law for the world.
Such a situation would amount to treating international lawyers as
philosopher-kings, entitled to rule simply by virtue of their wisdom.
Attractive as the prospect may be to international lawyers, one may
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doubt whether the rest of the planet is or should be prepared to
accept the principle of law professors' inherent right to sovereignty.
E. Rules RequiringResponses to Evil: Closing Thoughts
The bulk of the discussion in this section of this paper has cast
doubt on the rationales for legal rules specifying international
responses to serious outbreaks of evil and for the establishment of
institutions to enforce international legal rules against individuals
accused of perpetrating evil. A reader could be pardoned for
believing that the Article, in essence, advocates ignoring horrible
things happening a long way away.
To reject legal institutionalization of responses, however, is not
to reject the idea of a response. It is rather to reject the idea that the
proper policy for the individual cases of massive violations of human
rights can be specified by rule. Clearly, such an approach would not
mean that humanitarian interventions would never take place, but it
does mean that two different situations will be treated differently,
even when great suffering is common to both. This is unsatisfactory
only if one believes that the sole concern relevant to responding to
such situations is the nature of the wrong done. If one allows that,
for example, a choice to attack Russia to forestall its actions in
Chechnya would impose very different costs on the world than did the
choice to attack Serbia because of its actions in Kosovo, it is not
obvious why the two situations should be treated identically.
Likewise, if one ascribes any value at all to communities' ability to
control the important decisions affecting their members, surely there
is something to be said for leaving decisions on whether to wage
war-even for a good cause-to those whose lives would be at risk.
Similarly, to cast doubt on the utility of the ICC is not to express
indifference to the idea of reducing, as far as possible, the incidence of
violations of humanitarian law. It is rather to say that much can be
done at the national level, possibly with more effect than an ICC
could ever have. Indeed, in this connection, it should be stressed that
legal institutions at any level are not necessarily the most important
tools for minimizing the inevitable inhumanity of war.
The
distinguished military historian Sir John Keegan has observed:
In the most perceptive sentence in The Laws of War, Adam Roberts
observes, during his survey of the effect of the Hague Conventions of
1895 and 1907, that "the experience of land war in two world wars must
raise a question as to whether formal legal codification is necessarily
superior to notions of custom, honour, professional standards, and
natural law" in making for battlefield decencies. He might have made
his point more emphatically. There is no substitute for honour as a
medium of enforcing decency on the battlefield, never has been and
never will be. There are no judges, more to the point, no policemen at
the place where death is done in combat; that may be, in fact, the
intended, and all too often true, meaning of "silent leges inter arma."
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All turns on the values of the junior leader present at the moment when
the opponent's capacity or will to resist fails, when he ceases to be a
219
combatant and he must hope for the mercy of the suddenly stronger.

Questioning the ICC also involves asking why, if the
international community is not in a position to address the stresses a
given society will experience if it deals with the perpetrators of evil in
one way rather than another, the international community should
presume to determine how those perpetrators should be addressed.
It simply is not true that, for example, citizens of the United States
will be affected by the way South Africa deals with those who
maintained the system of apartheid as much as South African
citizens will be. Why should citizens of the United States, Germany,
or India claim some say in what the response should be if South
Africans must bear the vast bulk of the costs of responding to
apartheid?
Leaving international law and international legal institutions
out of the equation in addressing massive evil will doubtless seem
unsatisfactory to international lawyers. It is by no means clear,
however, that such an approach will necessarily have negative
consequences for the way the world responds to such situations.

VI. CONCLUSION

This Article has sought to show that international law regarding
states' rights or duties to respond to massive evil is hopelessly
confused. It has added that requiring efforts to forestall evil, as well
as establishing international institutions to deal with evil's
perpetrators, raises serious practical problems, threatens values
supposed to be fundamental in international law, assumes the
universality of values which are not universally held but which, like a
preference for moving governance questions to the international
level, derive more from faith than from reason.
Surely persons who seek to reduce the level of suffering in the
world are aiming at objectives which can only be applauded.
Lawyers, however, should be expected to support arguments as to the
proper shape of the law and legal institutions with something more
than proof of their good intentions.
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